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AIRLINE LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
HERBERT R. NORTHRUP*
L ABOR PROTECTIVE provisions (LPPs), as utilized in
-the railroad and airline industries, generally provide
that employees whosejobs are lost, downgraded, or trans-
ferred as a result of merger, acquisition, or transfer of sig-
nificant assets are entitled to compensation for as long as
five years. Other provisions relate to seniority, relocation
of place of work, etc. LPPs have been utilized in railroad
mergers and related situations as a result of either gov-
ernment orders or labor agreements for more than fifty
years and in analogous airline controversies since at least
1950.
The railroad industry has experienced declining em-
ployment since 1920 except for a sharp upsurge during
World War II. The airline industry, to the contrary, has
seen its employee count rise almost continually since
shortly before World War II through 1980, except for cyc-
lical declines, then decrease into 1983 before overcoming
the loss by early 1986. Both railroads and airlines were
restrictively regulated prior to the late 1970s. Now rail-
roads are somewhat deregulated and airlines are substan-
tially deregulated, except in matters concerning safety.
Throughout this period, Congress has not sought to
impose LPPs on industry generally. Instead, Congress
* Herbert R. Northrup, Professor of Industry and Director, Industrial Research
Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Ph.D. 1942, Harvard Uni-
versity. Lynda Filson provided material assistance in the construction of cost esti-
mates and Frank Bennett made several helpful comments.
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has deemed it wise to allow management, and, where
present, unions to prescribe the conditions under which
layoffs occasioned by mergers, company takeovers, or in-
deed any adverse impact upon employment will occur and
be mitigated. In the regulated railroad and airline indus-
tries, however, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), acting on
broad grants of power from Congress, regularly and al-
most automatically imposed LPPs as a price for approving
mergers, acquisitions, and certain other business transac-
tions.I In 1979, after the advent of deregulation, the CAB
particularly altered its policy, determining that LPPs
would be mandated in the future only "where necessary
to prevent labor strife that would disrupt the nation's air
transportation system."' 2 The Board did order LPPs in at
least four subsequent merger cases, however, reasoning
that unions had not had sufficient time to respond to the
changed circumstances.3 The Department of Transporta-
I An excellent history of the use of LPPs in the railroad and airline industries
prior to deregulation is found in S. B. ROSENFIELD, LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS
IN AIRLINE MERGERS (1981). Prior to deregulation, the CAB did not impose LPPs
in a few cases where the cost was so high as to negate benefits or where losses to
employees were slight or temporary. See American - Pan Am Route Exchange,
Employee Conditions, 74 C.A.B. 977, 979 (1977) (LPPs not imposed because
CAB found no systemwide impact on employees as a result of route swap); Fron-
tier Airlines, Temporary Suspension of Service, 58 C.A.B. 864, 869-70 (1972)
(LPPs not imposed on Frontier because the imposition of LPP would reduce the
financial benefits to Frontier from the suspension); Slick Airways, Suspension of
Service, 26 C.A.B. 779 (1958) (LPP not imposed because the purpose of the sus-
pension was to reduce Slick's losses and give it a reasonable opportunity to re-
sume service, and LPP would reduce the effectiveness of this strategy).
" See Braniff South American Route-Transfer Case, 102 C.A.B. 103, 127 (1983)
(the CAB limited LPPs to circumstances where they were necessary to mitigate
labor strife that would adversely affect air transportation as a whole); Dallas/Ft.
Worth -London Case, 100 C.A.B. 182, 196 (1983) (LPPs not imposed because
possibility of service disruption as a result of labor strife was unlikely); National
Airlines, Acquisition, 84 C.A.B. 408, 475 (1979) (CAB imposed LPPs because a
sudden change in policy would be unfair to labor organizations, but stated that in
the future LPPs would only be imposed when required by special circumstances);
see also Green, Labor Protective Provisions in the Airline Industry, 1950-1985, in ALI-
ABA Course of Study Materials: Airline Labor and Employment Law 6933 at 285-87
(1985).
" See Western Air Lines, Control by AFSI, 93 C.A.B. 545, 568 (1982)(LPPs im-
posed because CAB recognized that it was equitable to provide some period dur-
1987] LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS 403
tion (DOT), which took over some functions of the now
defunct CAB,4 has affirmed that it will not impose LPPs
except in the most extraordinary situations,5 and it has
not done so to date.6 The courts have endorsed the
DOT's policy as consistent with congressional policy. 7
The conference report accompanying the Airline Deregu-
ing which labor and management may negotiate merger protections); Seaboard
Acquisition by Tiger Int'l, 86 C.A.B. 29, 117 (1980) (LPPs imposed because labor
parties were not on notice of the CAB's new policy in time to bargain for their
own merger protection); Airwest, Acquisition by Republic Airlines, 86 C.A.B.
1971, 1976 (1980) (LPPs imposed because of insufficient time for labor and man-
agement to negotiate new terms in light of CAB's new LPP policy); National Air-
lines, 84 C.A.B. at 474 (imposed LPPs because labor had not had fair notice of a
change in policy); see also TXI - Continental Acquisition, Labor Provisions, 89
C.A.B. 223 (1981) (Texas International, the acquiring company, voluntarily ac-
cepted the standard LPPs).
In the following cases, all decided after deregulation, the CAB declined to im-
pose LPPs as a condition of merger: Transamerica Airlines Acquisition of Cent.
Am. Int'l, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 84-7-60 (July 19, 1984); C.A.B. Order No. 84-
10-5 (Oct. 12, 1984); C.A.B. Order No. 84-12-126 (Dec. 28, 1984); Braniff-Pacific
Southwest, Agreement Exemption, 100 C.A.B. 720, 726 (1983) (LPPs not im-
posed because the imposition of LPPs could actually increase the risk of labor
strife); Great N. Pilots, Petition, 86 C.A.B. 2226, 2229 (1980)(LPPs not imposed
because parties did not allege special circumstances sufficient to justify interven-
tion); Capital Control by Batchelor, ALPA Petition, 86 C.A.B. 2122, 2124 (1980)
(LPPs not imposed; CAB stated that LPPs are extraordinary measures used only
when problems threaten the stability of systemwide operations).
4 Congress terminated the CAB and transferred its functions to the Department
of Transportation effective December 31, 1981. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982).
% See Midway - Air Florida Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, D.O.T. Order
No. 85-6-33 at 6 (June 11, 1985) for a concise statement of DOT policy that has
since been reiterated in several cases.
a The DOT has declined to order the imposition of LPPs in the following cases:
American Airlines, Inc. and ACI Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-3-80 (Mar.
30, 1987) (American's takeover of Air California); NWA-Republic Acquisition
Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-7-81 (July 31, 1986) (Northwest acquired Republic);
Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-10-2 (Oct. 1, 1986)
(Texas Air acquired control of Eastern); Texas Air Corp. and People Express,
Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 86-10-53 (Oct. 24, 1986) (Texas Air's takeover of People
Express); Pacific Div. Transfer Case, D.O.T. Order No. 85-12-1 (Dec. 2, 1985)
(United's purchase of Pan American's Pacific routes).
7 See Braniff Master Executive Council of the Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB,
693 F.2d 220, 227-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (a general instruction to consider wages
and working conditions cannot be read as a congressional command to the CAB
to impose LPPs routinely); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 643 F.2d 935, 940
(2d Cir. 1981) (the Airline Deregulation Act does not require the CAB to consider
the labor implications of a carrier's proposal).
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lation Act of 1978 states that congressional policy
provides:
The 'public interest' standard in section 408(b) of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 is retained in the new section,
but that standard must now be interpreted in light of the
intent of Congress to move the airline industry rapidly to-
ward deregulation. The foundation of the new airline leg-
islation is that it is in the public interest to allow the airline
industry to be governed by the forces of the marketplace.8
Meanwhile, in the railroad industry, the Reagan admin-
istration successfully opposed including a LPP in the 1986
legislation providing for the sale of Conrail to the public. 9
Furthermore, the ICC has declined to impose LPPs in
sales of trackage by a major rail carrier to small carriers
(short lines) which, because of low overhead and highly
productive, nonunion labor, can use such trackage profit-
ably. 10 To alter these policies, both the airline and the
railroad unions" have sought for several years to make
LPPs mandatory in most major business intercarrier
transactions. Congress failed to include bills to this effect
in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.12 In 1982 Con-
gress again refused to enact such bills for the airline in-
* H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978).
* Agreement Reportedly Reached on Scrapping Labor Protection from Conrail Sale Mea-
sure, 195 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-10- 11 (Oct. 8, 1986)[hereinafter Agreement].
- Machalaba, Many New Railroads Are in Business for the Short Haul, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 24, 1986, at 5, col. 1. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94
Star. 1895 (1980), decreased economic regulation in the railroad industry. 49
U.S.C. § 10505(g)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1987) provides, however, that the ICC may
not "relieve a carrier of its obligation to protect the interests of employees" with
respect to matters generally coming within the framework of LPPs. See McDonald,
Airline Management Prerogative in the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 869
(1987).
"1 Two of the largest of these unions, the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline
Clerks and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
represent a major group of employees in both industries.
A different protective measure was included in the deregulation law provid-
ing for prior employment rights to employees laid off as a result of merger and for
financial assistance to displaced workers. Litigation concerning these provisions
was finally concluded in 1987, but the measure remains dormant as described infra
text accompanying notes 32-37.
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dustry.13 Then, in the 2nd session of the 99th Congress,
two bills passed the House of Representatives. The first
bill, H.R. 4838, would have mandated LPP coverage for
all airline mergers, acquisitions, or transfers of significant
assets. The second bill, H.R. 5300, would have provided
that after the sale of Conrail to the public, any employees
adversely affected by the sale or abandonment of rail lines
would be covered by a LPP. The Senate rejected both
provisions and also voted down attempts to include such
legislation in the continuing budget resolution.14 Inter-
estingly, pilots from Trans World Airlines (TWA), People
Express, and Frontier Airlines opposed H.R. 4838 during
the Senate's consideration of the bill "either because it
could have imperiled merger or wiped out their seniority
preferences."' 5
Despite such cracks in their solidarity, the airline and
railroad unions again have sponsored LPP legislation.
H.R. 3332, the railroad proposal, would extend LPPs not
only to the sales and abandonments which might result
now that Conrail has been sold to the public, but also to
all railroad sales and abandonments, including those to
short lines, which the ICC now exempts from instituting
LPPs. Both H.R. 1101,16 which the House of Representa-
tives passed by a voice vote on June 22, 1987, and S. 943,
which is almost identical to H.R. 1101, pertain to airlines
and contain the exact language as did H.R. 4838. H.R.
1101 was also included as part of H.R. 3035, which passed
both the House and the Senate in October 1987. H.R.
3332 was included in the Senate version as well (see Ap-
pendix A).
This study first examines the nature of LPPs, and then
1. Senate Reects Airline Employee Protection Measure, 157 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at
A-8-10 (Aug. 13, 1982).
s4 Senate Refuses to Enact Measure to Protect Seniority in Air Mergers, 191 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at A-10-1 1 (Oct. 2, 1986) [hereinafter Senate Refuses]; see Stuart, Accord
Near on Conrail Sale, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at D4, col. 2; Agreement, supra note 9
and accompanying text.
, See Senate Refuses, supra note 14, at A-i 1.
i" See infra Appendix A for a reproduction of H.R. 1101 and notes thereon.
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traces their background, development, and application to
the airline industry. The main part of the study then fol-
lows, in which the costs of LPPs to the airline industry are
estimated under various realistic scenarios, and the bene-
fits of LPPs to different classes of labor are examined.
The final section deals with pertinent economic consider-
ations, particularly the potential impact of the costs of
LPPs upon carrier policies and employment.
I. THE NATURE OF LPPs
A fruitful way to understand the nature of LPPs is to
examine H.R. 1101, which, as noted, is almost identical to
S. 943. H.R. 1101 is a very short bill, since its effective
provisions are largely implemented by reference to other
laws, rulings, and actions. It would amend section 408 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 195817 by requiring that:
In any case which the Secretary [of Transportation] deter-
mines that the transaction which is the subject of the appli-
cation would tend to cause reduction in employment, or to
adversely affect the wages and working conditions includ-
ing the seniority of any air carrier employees, labor pro-
tective provisions calculated to mitigate such adverse
consequences, including procedures culminating in bind-
ing arbitration, if necessary, shall be imposed by the Sec-
retary as a condition of approval, unless the Secretary
finds that the projected costs of protection would exceed
the anticipated financial benefits of the transaction. The
proponents of the transaction shall bear the burden of
proving there will be no adverse employment conse-
quences or that projected costs of protection would be
excessive.
"Transactions" covered pursuant to this paragraph, by
reference to section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act, in-
clude not only mergers and acquisitions involving two or
more airlines, but also any transaction between two air-
lines which involves the transfer of airplanes or other as-
sets comprising a substantial proportion of airline
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378 (1982).
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properties. The CAB has historically defined a "substan-
tial proportion" as ten percent or more of a carrier's total
property value.' 8 If, however, any party outside the air-
line industry were to acquire an airline, H.R. 1101 would
not apply. To put the matter in a practical context, not
only would United Airlines' failed attempt in 1986 to take
over Frontier Airlines have fallen within the purview of
H.R. 1101, but also its prior purchase of twenty-five Fron-
tier aircraft would have triggered the need for LPPs if
Congress had enacted H.R. 1101. If Frontier had sold the
aircraft to a surplus plane dealer, however, who in turn
sold them to United or to another airline, H.R. 1101
would not have reached the transaction unless it was
demonstrated to be a subterfuge to avoid the coverage of
H.R. 1101.
The 1985 battle for the control of TWA provides an-
other illustration of the far-reaching but eclectic jurisdic-
tion which H.R. 1101 would establish.' 9 If Texas Air had
been the successful bidder for TWA, H.R. 1101 would
have required a LPP. Since Carl Icahn, who won control
of the airline, was from outside the industry, he would
have had no such obligation in his successful takeover of
the airline under H.R. 1101.
Just as the jurisdiction of H.R. 1101 is apparent only by
reference, so, likewise, the nature and scope of the LPPs it
would require are not found in the bill. There appears to
be general agreement, however, that the bill would re-
quire provisions identical, or nearly so, to the provisions
Is The ten percent requirement necessary to bring the transaction within the
purview of section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act and its predecessor legislation
was determined in Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50, 55 (1947).
Section 408(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act refers only to a "substantial
portion" of a carrier's property as coming within regulatory purview. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378(a)(1) (1982). Thus, the ten percent criterion could be modified
administratively.
It For a discussion of the 1985 battle for TWA, see Application of TWA for the
Institution of an Investigation on its Prospective Continuing Fitness under Sec-
tion 401(r) of the Federal Aviation Act in the Event Carl C. Icahn Secures Control
of TWA, D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-16 (June 10, 1985); Texas Air Corp. and Trans
World Airlines, D.O.T. Order No. 85-8-48 (Aug. 16 1985); Texas Air Corp. and
Trans World Airlines, D.O.T. Order No. 85-8-50 (Aug. 19, 1985).
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first ennunciated by the CAB following the 1947 sale to
United of Western's Denver-Los Angeles route.2 0 The
CAB continued to institute these provisions in almost
every case during the regulation era. The provisions
evolved into virtually final form,2' first in the takeover of
Capital by United in 196122 and then in the Allegheny
(now USAir) merger with Mohawk Airlines in 1972.28 The
"20 The CAB approved the transfer of Western's route No. 68 to United in
United-Western, Acquisition Air Cartier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947). At that time the
Board declined to attach any employee protective provisions to the sale. In 1948,
the CAB ordered the proceeding be reopened to determine whether any employ-
ees of Western had been adversely affected as a consequence of the transfer of
route No. 68. United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B.
701, 702 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1952). The Board found it "clear that a portion of the employees who suffered
adverse consequences would not have suffered them if Western had not trans-
ferred the route and the equipment necessary to operate it." Id. at 706. The
Board determined that it had implied authority to impose employee protective
provisions upon the transfer. Id. at 707.
21 The Board first imposed labor protective provisions in
United-Western, Acquisition Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701
(1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1952). In that case and in the following North Atlantic Route
Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950), the Board adopted several fea-
tures of the so-called Burlington Formula, developed by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, with certain modifications considered
appropriate. In the Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B.
708 (1952), the Board incorporated certain features of the Washing-
ton Agreement of 1936, an agreement resulting from nationwide
collective bargaining in the railroad industry, again with modifica-
tions considered appropriate. Thus, the Board's labor protective
provisions have been selectively developed on a basis consisting of
two formulas carefully worked out in the railroad industry. In the
Delta-Chicago and Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952),
certain changes were made which have been retained in subsequent
cases. Finally, in the Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326
(1954), a revision was made to clarify the Board's intention on a cer-
tain point.
United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B 307, 323 n.71 (1961).
211 United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
In general, it will be see that we have adhered very closely to the
provisions imposed in the last five cases, in accordance with our view
that it is undesirable to make changes in the standard provisions
which have been imposed in preceding cases unless required by ex-
perience indicating need for such changes or by the particular fac-
tual circumstances of the case being decided.
id. at 323-24.
2.4 Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, 59 C.A.B. 19 (1972). "Since the 1961
United-Capital Merger Case, the Board has consistently applied the same set of labor
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provisions apply to dismissals and displacements which
occur within three years from the effective date of the or-
ders and include the following benefits:
1. Seniority Integration. This is to be accomplished "in a
fair and equitable manner, including, where applicable,
agreement through collective bargaining," with arbitra-
tion required if no agreement is reached.
2. Maintenance of Pay. This provides that regardless of
the job and job pay to which the employee is assigned as a
result of the actions covered by LPPs, such affected em-
ployees may not have their compensation reduced as long
as they are unable to use seniority rights to obtain a com-
parable position in the same location.
(a) Employees who are placed in lower-rated jobs re-
ceive the difference in pay between their former and pres-
ent jobs as a "displacement allowance."
(b) Employees entitled to such payments are termed
"displaced employees," even though they are not dis-
placed in the ordinary sense of the term. "Displacement
allowances" are determined by dividing the last twelve
months total compensation of the employee by twelve and
paying the employee each month the amount by which
that sum exceeds the employee's current monthly salary.
If an employee works more hours in the current job than
in the previous one, the extra time compensation at the
rate of the new job is paid. Only voluntary absence can
result in reduction in compensation below the previous
job rate.
(c) Displacement allowances are triggered immediately
upon job changes which reduce compensation.
(d) Displacement allowance protection extends for a
period of four years from the date of the employee's dis-
protective provisions." Id. at 3 1. See Kahn, Collective Bargaining on the Airline Flight
Deck, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN
TRANSPORTATION 472-73 (1971); Note, CAB and Labor Jurisdiction, 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 334, 335 (1967); see also S. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, for a detailed study of
the United-Capital LPP provisions without a cost analysis.
19871 409
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placement. Thus, this liability could still be in effect seven
years after the LPP was imposed.
(e) Employees with less than one year of service are not
covered by displacement benefits, but are eligible for five
days pay, at the straight-time rate per working day of the
position last occupied, for each full month in which he or
she performed such service. This amount must be paid in
a lump sum.
3. Dismissal Allowances. This provides a very elaborate,
generous, and long-lasting system of unemployment com-
pensation for dismissed employees covered by LPPs. The
dismissed employees receive a monthly payment equiv-
alent to sixty percent of their average monthly compensa-
tion for the previous twelve months prior to being
dismissed. This allowance is paid for a period varying
from six months to five years, depending upon the af-
fected employee's seniority. Employees who receive this
allowance are subject to recall to service, provided the re-
call does not require a change in place of residence. If the
job to which the employee is recalled pays less than the
employee's previous job, the employee is eligible for the
displacement allowance. For employees who receive
other employment or unemployment compensation, the
dismissal allowance is reduced to the extent that any un-
employment insurance benefits exceed the amount on
which the dismissal allowance is based.
This provision applies to all dismissals covered by LPPs
over a three-year period commencing with the effective
date of the merger. Thus, this liability could be enforced
up to eight years after the effective date of the merger.
4. Fringe Benefit Guarantees. During the "applicable pe-
riod" of the LPP, i.e., the period of eligibility for al-
lowances stated above, a covered employee may not "be
deprived of benefits attaching to his previous employ-
ment." The employee, therefore, retains the old benefits
during the displacement or dismissal period. The car-
rier's liability, once again, could be in effect up to eight
years later.
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5. Severance Pay. Employees eligible for a dismissal al-
lowance may instead resign. They are then entitled to
severance or separation pay equal to three to twelve
months of their last twelve months average monthly com-
pensation. Employees with less than one year of service
who are not eligible for a dismissal allowance receive five
days pay for each full month in which they worked, if they
were dismissed as a result of the merger. This carrier ob-
ligation lasts for three years.
6. Moving Expenses. Employees covered by LPPs who
are required to move in order to accept an assigned job
are entitled to full moving expenses for themselves and
their families. If the employee owns a home and cannot
sell it for "fair value," the carrier must either compensate
the employee for the difference between the value of the
home and its selling price or purchase the home. If the
employee is under contract to purhase a home or holds an
unexpired lease on a home, the carrier must protect the
employee from all loss. This carrier obligation lasts for
three years.
7. No Requirement to Work Out of Class. Employees can-
not be deprived of any LPP benefits because they decline
to accept a position out of their craft or class.
8. Pre-Acquisition Actions and Notice. Any change in the
workforce which anticipates the action that triggers the
LPP is covered by the LPP. Carriers are required to give
forty-five days notice to employees of all proposed
changes in the employees' status.
These requirements, as set forth in various CAB orders,
are extraordinarily detailed and are not found in any leg-
islation or administrative ruling affecting any industries
other than railroads and airlines. Both unionized compa-
nies and nonunion managements in industry generally
often institute various provisions for employees adversely
affected by mergers and acquisitions, even though LPPs
are not mandatory. Likewise, airlines often institute pro-
visions similar to LPPs in situations in which LPPs are not
mandatory. A diligent search of literature has, however,
1987] 411
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uncovered no parallel to H.R. 1101 in industry generally,
in terms of either the liberality, the coverage, or the dura-
tion of the benefits. Before examining what possible costs
are involved by the imposition of LPPs as proposed by
H.R. 1101, and what would be the consequences thereof,
it is pertinent to examine briefly how and why LPPs
evolved.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF LPPs
From their inception, railroads and their labor relations
were regulated apart from industry generally. The once
overriding significance of the railroads as freight carriers,
the fact that they were clearly within the constitutional
scope of interstate commerce and therefore subject to
congressional regulation, the early rise of railroad unions
to economic and political power, and the government
takeover of the railroad system during World War I all
enhanced this approach. After World War I, efforts were
made to consolidate the railroad system. These efforts
led to an interest in job protection for railroad employees,
especially since the 1920s saw the beginning of the secu-
lar decline in employment in the railroad industry.
LPPs were first legislated with the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933, which was designed to pro-
mote consolidation and to eliminate unnecessary duplica-
tion of services. Section 7(b) of this act, however, froze
into their jobs all railroad employees actively employed in
May, 1933, who might be affected by reason of action
taken pursuant to authority contained in the Emergency
Railroad Transportation Act of 1933.... Again, for a vari-
ety of reasons, not the least of which was this 'job freeze,'
no significant consolidations took place under this
legislation.24
With the 1933 emergency law scheduled to expire, un-
4 Rehmus, Collective Bargaining and Technological Change on American Railroads, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN TRANSPORTA-
TION 144 (1971).
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ions sought special LPP legislation. The carriers, hoping
to negotiate more favorable terms, found themselves
under intense pressure from the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration, so they acceded to the unions' demands
for a LPP agreement. The so-called Washington Agree-
ment was signed on May 21, 1936, between twenty-one
railroad unions and carriers representing eighty-five per-
cent of the nation's railroads. It covered "coordination,"
or "joint action by two or more carriers whereby they
unify, consolidate, merge, or pool" any part of their sepa-
rate facilities or operation. Thereafter, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) expanded the Washington
Agreement, applying it to leases of one carrier's facilities,
abandonments, etc. The Transportation Act of 1940 af-
firmed the ICC's authority in this regard.25 The Washing-
ton Agreement provisions, as interpreted and ordered by
the ICC, have served as a model for the LPPs required by
the CAB in the airline industry.
A. Application to Airlines
When the railroad industry was in deep decline, Con-
gress adopted the policy of treating transportation em-
ployee relations differently from the employee relations of
industries in general. Congress then transferred this pol-
icy to the fledgling and growing airline industry. Thus, in
1936 Congress placed the airlines under the Railway La-
bor Act, even though the act's basic procedures were de-
veloped in practice in railroad labor relations, and labor
relations in airlines were still in the formative state. In
addition, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,26 section
401(1), wrote into law Decision 83 by the National Labor
Board of the National Industrial Recovery Act. This gave
airline pilots the highest minimum wage law in the nation,
25 Id. at 144-48; see R. J. ABLES, The History of and Experience under Railroad Em-
ployee Protection Plans, Studies Relating to Railroad Operating Employees, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL RAILROAD COMMISSION 107-91 app. vol. III (1962) for a more de-
tailed study.
va Ch. 601, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
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if not in the world, and made compliance with the Railway
Labor Act a condition of being a certificated carrier.
These provisions have been continued in subsequent leg-
islation. The CAB adopted LPPs as a condition of ap-
proving mergers, sales of assets, and other transactions
between or among airlines. The Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 provided no explicit directive for such action, but
the courts agreed that it was within the inherent power of
the CAB.27
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 continued special
protection for airline employees and unions as a national
policy. 28 This legislation effectively outlawed the airlines'
Mutual Aid Pact.2 9 As a result, airlines are the only indus-
try in which employers may not have such a pact. This
weakens management's bargaining power. Nothing in the
law proscribes similar combinations among unions, and
frequently they do form alliances.8 0
27 Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act allows the CAB to approve mergers,
acquisitions and route transfers "upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to
be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe." 49
U.S.C. § 1378 (1982). In Western Air Lines v. CAB, the court held that the CAB
may condition its approval of transactions on provisions for the protection of em-
ployees. 194 F.2d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1952). The court stated that "[a]lthough
there is no express statutory grant of power to impose conditions which will
lessen the adverse impact of a merger upon employees of the merged companies,
such power is implicit as one necessary to the performance of the [CAB's] duty to
condition approval with due regard to terms which are just and reasonable in the
interest of the public." Id. at 215; see Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) (the CAB's power to impose LPPs is implicit as
one necessary to the performance of the Board's duty to condition approval with
regard to terms which are just and reasonable in the interest of public).
28 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
' 49 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(1982). A Mutual Aid Pact is an agreement between air
carriers that provides that any participating carrier will receive payments from the
other participating carriers for any period during which that carrier is undergoing
a labor strike. Id. § 1382(c)(3)(A).
,, On August 12, 1986, for example, it was announced that seven unions "are
working on a joint strategy for their role in United Airlines' planned takeover of
Frontier Airlines." 7 Unions Map Frontier Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at D6,
col. 3. On January 12, 1987, Teamster Airline Division Director William Genoese
said "the union remains committed to organizing at Continental and is 'trying to
put a consortium together with other unions' including the Air Line Pilots Associ-
ation to organize at Continental and other carriers owned by Texas Air Corpora-
tion." Ballots from 1983 Vote at Continental Unsealed; Teamsters Lose Bid to Represent
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The Airline Deregulation Act also established an em-
ployee protection plan (EPP) which contains provisions
for assistance payments to employees who are laid off or
furloughed as a result of bankruptcy or a fifteen percent
or more reduction in force.-3 Litigation delayed the im-
plementation of this section until March 1987.32 Con-
gress has never provided an appropriation to effectuate it,
however, and is apparently not likely to do so before Oc-
tober 22, 1988, when, by its terms, the provision
expires.3 3
Still another provision of the Airline Deregulation Act
gives airline employees who were employed on or before
October 24, 1978, and furloughed after four years of em-
ployment with a certificated carrier, the right, on or
before October 24, 1988, to preferential employment by
any airline seeking new employees.3 4 Nevertheless, such
furloughed employees retain seniority rights on the car-
rier that laid them off.3 5 The Act requires the Secretary of
Labor to maintain a national list of eligible employees.36
Litigation and administrative delays prevented the imple-
mentation of this section, also. This section was imple-
mented on January 31, 1986, but it suffered a two month
suspension because of litigation. It was re-implemented it
on June 9, 1986. Meanwhile, expanding airline employ-
ment has obviated both its need and its utilization.3 7
Ground Employees, 7 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-I (Jan. 12, 1987). Such inter-
union cooperation in the industry has occurred for many years.
29 C.F.R. § 220.10 (1986).
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). In Alaska Airlines the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue whether the legislative veto written into
section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act, which provided for an employee pro-
tection provision, rendered the entire provision invalid. Id. at 1479. The Court
ruled that the legislative-veto provision was severable from the remainder of the
EPP program. Id at 1477.
49 U.S.C. § 1552j) (1982).
Id. § 1552(d)(1).
" Id.
- Id § 1552(d)(2).
.57 See Airline Employee Protection Program, 29 C.F.R. § 220 (1986), reprinted in
226 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at E-1-12 (Nov. 22, 1983); DOL Resumes Job Listing
Program to Aid Workers Who Lost Jobs After Air Deregulation, 108 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at A-4 (June 5, 1986).
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B. Rationale for LPPs
The CAB enunciated its rationale behind the imposi-
tion of LPPs in numerous rulings. In United-Western, Acqui-
sition Air Carrier Property,"8 the first case involving this issue
in 1950, the CAB reasoned that some benefits of the route
transfer from Western to United would be "at the ex-
pense of some of the employees of the companies in-
volved."3 9 It quoted the United States Supreme Court,
saying that "the national interest in the stability of the la-
bor supply available" was important, and "an obvious na-
tional interest in taking steps to see that route transfers
and mergers which are in the public interest should not be
prevented or delayed by labor difficulties arising out of
hardships to employees incident to such route transfers or
mergers.1 40 The CAB routinely reiterated such conten-
tions in subsequent cases.4'
These arguments were grounded on two basic consid-
erations. The first consideration, clearly borrowed from
the railroad industry, provided that laid-off employees
would have little chance of reemployment. The second
consideration, inherent in a regulated industry in which
competition was strictly limited, was the belief that no
competitor could take up the economic slack. The first ra-
tionale failed to recognize that the airline industry, unlike
the railroad industry, was an expanding industry in which,
despite cyclical setbacks, employment tended upwards
throughout its history. Deregulation, of course, demol-
ished the second rationale. Since deregulation, any air-
line can enter any domestic market, and this has become
the norm whenever traffic justifies such action. Thus laid-
off employees from a failed or declining carrier may have
opportunities with a new or expanding one.42
- 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Western Airlines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1952).
,' Id. at 708.
41, Id. (quoting United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939)); see KAHN, supra
note 23, at 473.
41 See S. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, for a careful summary of these arguments.
-, No emergency board has been appointed pursuant to the statutory provi-
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Following deregulation, therefore, the CAB announced
in the National Airlines, Acquisition Case43 that it would order
LPPs only where required by "special circumstances. 44
Although the CAB did not implement this policy fully, the
DOT, which took over some of the duties of the defunct
CAB, has, as already noted, vigorously maintained this
position. The DOT pointed out in several cases that the
imposition of LPPs could cause the purchasing carrier to
veto the transaction. This would result in the loss ofjobs
for the employees of the merging carrier, which was in
extreme financial difficulty and likely to cease operation
without the transaction.45 In other cases, the DOT
pointed out that the parties had reached a merger agree-
ment and LPPs were unnecessary. 46 This carefully enun-
ciated policy has drawn the ire of the air transport unions
and has caused them to encourage the introduction into
Congress of H.R. 1101 and S. 943, as well as three bills in
sions of the Railway Labor Act in an airline case since the mid 1960s, because
sufficient competition exists to limit the impact of strikes. Actually no strikes have
occurred since deregulation that can be attributed directly to mergers. TheJohn-
son administration adopted this policy of not appointing emergency boards in
airline cases after a strike in 1966 which shut down five airlines but caused no
major disruption in commerce. An emergency board was appointed in the Wien
Air (Alaska) case in 1978, but this was a special case mandated by the 1978 dereg-
ulation statute at the request of the Air Line Pilots Association. See Northrup, The
New Employee-Relations Climate in Airlines, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 167, 172-73
[hereinafter New Employee-Relations Climate]; FORTY-Firm ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1979 at
28-29.
4- 84 C.A.B. 408 (1979).
4 Id. at 475. "LPPs will no longer be imposed as a matter of course, or because
tradition dictates their use." Id.
"5 See Southwest Airlines-Muse Air Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding, D.O.T.
Order No. 85-6-79 at 33 (June 2, 1985) (Southwest indicated it would not com-
plete the original transaction if LPPs were imposed; Muse was in serious financial
difficulties and needed the transaction to continue operation); Midway-Air Florida
Acquisition Show-Cause Proceeding, D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-33 at 3 (June 11,
1985) (Midway would not proceed with the acquisition if LPPs were imposed,
which would result in the denial ofjobs to Air Florida employees).
46 NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-7-81 at 22 (July 31,
1986)(private decision-making adequately protected the employees' interests); Pa-
cific Div. Transfer Case, D.O.T. Order No. 85-12-1 (Dec. 12, 1985) (LPPs unnec-
essary because United made clear it was willing to discuss such issues with
employees).
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earlier Congresses, H.R. 5930 and S. 2666 in 1982, and
H.R. 4838 in 1986, all of which failed to be enacted into
law.47 As discussed below, one reason for opposition to
LPPs is that they provide special treatment for airline em-
ployees. A second reason is, of course, the cost, which
apparently has not been estimated carefully heretofore for
the airline industry and has been estimated in only a few
case studies for the railroad industry.48
III. ESTIMATING LPP COSTS
The lack of cost data regarding LPPs is not surprising.
Perfectly accurate cost data can be developed only after
the fact. Projections are subject to error because changes
in traffic flow, new competition, and a host of other fac-
tors can alter such projections. Nevertheless, reasonably
reliable estimates can be made by utilizing realistic as-
sumptions concerning employee furloughs, displace-
ments, and moves that might be required in the case of
mergers of various sizes. To accomplish this, three hypo-
thetical situations have been constructed. It has been
postulated that, as a result of a merger, three possible sce-
narios may occur: the closing of a carrier's major hub, of
one of its medium-sized hubs, and of one of its small
hubs.
A. Three Scenarios Defined
None of these hypothetical hubs replicate exactly an ex-
isting one. Rather, they reflect actual situations that could
47 See supra notes 13-14.
" See R. ABLES, supra note 25, for the railroad studies, which covered the pre-
1960 era. An unpublished study of the United-Capital airline merger of 1961,
made in 1966 by a Wharton School group under the present author's direction,
contains limited data on the costs of relocation, training, and extended fringe
benefits. Thus, United's estimated one-time merger costs for LPP purposes were
$4.3 million. By 1963 it had, however, lost two million dollars on homes involved
in relocation, and spent over one million dollars in training and over one million
dollars on extended fringe benefit coverage, in addition to the cost of displace-
ments and dismissals. See Northrup, Management and Merger: A Study of the 1961
Merger of Capital Airlines and United Air Lines 161-62 (1966) (unpublished study,
Wharton Industrial Research Unit).
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occur in a number of areas. For example, the large hub
scenario could take place at the Chicago, Atlanta, Los An-
geles, or New York airports. The medium-sized hub might
be at Miami, St. Louis, San Francisco, or Detroit. The
small hub could be found in Salt Lake City, Washington
D.C., or Nashville. Many other hubs would fit into these
categories which are not rigidly defined. It should be em-
phasized that when a hub is reduced or eliminated, so are
its spokes. The short flights that bring passengers into a
hub for connections become uneconomic when long haul
connecting flights no longer exist. Hence, the data in




Base Large Per- Medium Per- Small Per-
Statistics Number Hub cent Hub cent Hub cent
Daily ASMs 4,314,511 1,294,353 30 862,902 20 431,451 10
Daily Departures 1,385 499 36 180 13 125 9
Monthly Block 73,909 23,651 32 13,304 18 8,130 11
Hours
Monthly Pilot 195,875 59,740 30 38,198 20 21,584 11
Hours
Monthly Flight 294,521 80,994 28 69,426 24 26,029 9
Attendant Hours
Assumptions
" Each succeedingly larger hub is a multiple of the smallest hub in daily activity on
daily ASMs, i.e., the large hub has three times the daily activity of the small hub.
* ASM - available seat mileage.
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TABLE 2










Original Large Hub Per- Medium Hub Per- Small Hub Per-
Complement Reductions cent Reductions cent Reductions cent
3,699 1,124 30 740 20 406 11














" Pilot reductions are based on reduced monthly Pilot hours.
" Flight Attendant reductions are based on reduced monthly Flight Attendant hours.
" Station and Line Maintenance reductions are based on reductions in Daily
Departures.




Hour Pilot Hour Pilot Hour Pilot
Equip- Utiliza- Reduc- Reduc- Reduc- Reduc- Reduc- Reduc-


























* Flying is reduced by aircraft type as reflected in the table above.
" Crew reductions are based on individual block hour reductions by type of aircraft.
* Pilot utilization is based on planned monthly pilot hours divided by headcount re-
quired on the monthly pilot bid.
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TABLE 4
FLIGHT ATrENDANTS
Flight Attendant Flight Attendant
Base Utilization Hour Reductions Reductions
Large 52.3 80,994 1,549
Medium 52.3 69,426 1,327
Small 52.3 26,029 498
Assumptions
" Flight Attendant hour cut backs are based on reductions for a mix of aircraft and do
not fall proportionally with block hour reductions, i.e., an hour of flight on a DC-10
has seven Flight Attendants compared to an hour on a B-727 which has four Flight
Attendants.
" Flight Attendant utilization is based on planned monthly'flight attendant hours, di-
vided by the headcount required on the monthly flight attendant bid.
TABLE 5
STATION HEADCOUNT REDUCTION
Cleri- Ramp Stock Facility
Hub Mgmt. Agent cal Skycap Service Cleaner Mechanic Clerk Service Total
Large 412 1,441 132 107 1,933 342 898 85 42 5,388
Medium 152 568 69 93 659 259 108 9 30 1,946
Small 127 460 27 14 527 45 141 5 2 1,347
Assumptions
* The Station Headcount Reduction is based on total reductions in departures at the
hub stations specified and the associated reductions in departures at downline
stations.
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TABLE 6
ALL OTHER REDUCTIONS
Employee Category Number of Employees Large Medium Small
Base Maintenance 3,290 1,025 667 342
Reservations 4,661 1,453 945 485
SATOs 149 - - -
CTOs 301 94 60 32
Non-Management Staff 1,769 551 358 183
Management Staff 3,272 1,019 663 339
Foreign Employees 363 - 74 -
Total 13,805 4,142 2,767 1,381
Assumptions
* These categories of employees have been directly related to ASMs.
" The reductions specified are in direct proportion to the ASM reductions reflected in
the closure of each hub.
* SATOs = Scheduled Airline Ticket Offices.
* CATOs = City Ticket Offices.
The basic data for the three scenario hubs are set forth
in Tables 1-6. Table 1 shows that the assumptions pro-
vide for each succeedingly larger hub to be a multiple of
the smallest hub in daily activity based upon available seat
miles (ASMs). The balance of the data in Table 1 com-
prises estimates of departures, block hours, and pilot and
flight attendant hours that are consistent with the ASMs.
The numbers and percentages under each hub show the
number and percentage of each hub's reductions for a
given level of reduced activity. (A more detailed explana-
tion of the assumptions and methodology utilized in con-
structing the hubs and costs is found in Appendix B.)
Table 2 summarizes the headcount reduction by various
groups resulting from the closing of the various hubs,
while Tables 3-6 break down the same data by employee
classification. In these tables, assumptions also have been
made regarding the aircraft in use. For simplification,
only four aircraft types are assumed, but those chosen re-
flect varying cockpit and flight attendant complements so
that the assumptions involve realistic situations.
It is quite clear from Tables 1-6 that considerable
change would occur in all three hubs as a result of a shut-
down of our mythical merged carrier's operations in any
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of the three projected scenarios. This is, of course, what
proponents of H.R. 1101 claim could happen and why
they advocate compulsory governmental imposition of
LPPs in such situations. The examination of the costs and
the implications of LPPs which follows, however, raises
serious questions about the viability of LPPs as job saving
instruments.
B. The Wage-Cost Factor
Any analysis of the costs of LPPs must commence with
airline wages and salaries, which are among the highest in
industry. Table 7 provides a summary of contractual
wage data for 1986 based upon the top rate of the "A"
scale, as compiled by the Airline Industrial Relations Con-
ference (AIR Conference). The complete data are avail-
able from the AIR Conference. Figure 1 supports the
statement concerning the comparatively high wage and
salary scale of airline employees-sixty-nine percent
higher than the U.S. industry average-utilizing 1985 av-
erage wage data compiled by the Air Transport Associa-
tion from figures supplied to the DOT by the airlines.
Although the high average wages are, of course, affected
by six figure pilots' salaries, Table 7 shows clearly that all
grades of employees are generously compensated.
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE AIRLINE WAGE BY EMPLOYEE
CLASSIFICATION
BASED ON Top RATE OF "A"
SCALE- 1986
Employee Average Annual Employee Average Annual
Classification Rate of Pay Classification Rate of Pay




Switchboard Operator 19,622. DC-10 $101,676
Computer Operator 26,247 B-757b 112,956
Accounting Clerk 19,541 B-727 96,048
Crew Scheduler 29,714 DC-9 84,516
Reservation Sales Agent 26,335
Station Agent 27,134 1st Officer
Teletype Operator 28,148 DC-10 70,560
B-757b 76,716
Diatchers B-727 66,876
Dispatcher $44,323 DC-9 57,672
Assistant Dispatcher 32,284
2nd Officer
Ground Crew& DC-10 59,400
Mechanic $32,926 B-757 N/A
Stock Clerk 27,394 B-727 57,132




Source: Airline Industrial Relations Conference
a. Pilot/flight attendant pay is an average annualized yield based on 75 hours per
month. This average includes the major and national carriers, but of course is
not a general average as set forth in Figure I and Table 8.
b. B-757 average wages are not as representative since there were only two
airlines using this type of aircraft when the data were collected.
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FIGURE 1










In 1985, the average compensation for 355,000 airline employees was 69%
higher than the U.S. industry average.








Compensation (incl. fringes, i.e.
social security, unemployment,
insurance and pension). 43,100 35,500 105,950
Wages (excl. fringes) 34,950 28,800 85,700
Airline employees are among the world's most highly compensated. This is the





The high wages paid to airline employees are attributa-
ble both to the effects of regulation and to the service na-
1987]
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ture of the airline passenger business. As Bailey, Graham,
and Kaplan point out, "regulation's lack of price competi-
tion encouraged service competition and reduced carri-
ers' incentives to control costs. In the 1960s when fares
did not fall as rapidly as costs, labor costs rose at the same
time service competition was increasing. '49 These au-
thors then summarize the reasons why carriers under reg-
ulation failed to control labor costs.
First, during regulation carriers could not expand freely
by entering new markets, nor could they reduce prices to
take business from competitors. Moreover, inefficiency
was insulated because the CAB determined fares based on
average costs and often bolstered inefficient carriers by
awarding them new routes. The CAB would merge a car-
rier on the verge of failure with a prosperous carrier that
coveted its routes before the GAB would permit the
merged carrier to fail. For example, United took over
Capital in 1961, and Delta acquired Northeast about ten
years later. In both mergers the viability of the acquired
carrier was in serious doubt. Under such circumstances,
Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan state that "CAB regulation
substantially reduced the long-run payoff from achieve-
ment of a lean, efficient airline." 50
Opposition to union demands for uneconomic wages
and conditions had a minimum return for other reasons.
Generally, the carriers could pass high labor costs along
as higher fares. Then, too, strikes in service businesses are
very costly because the product cannot be warehoused.
Business lost during a strike is lost forever, and perma-
nent losses may occur if potential passengers become ac-
customed to traveling on a competitive airline. In
addition, key airline employees are highly specialized and
licensed, making operation during a strike very risky and
even fatal if a serious accident occurs. Therefore, the air-
lines under regulation generally sought accommodation
- E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 95-96
(1985).
it Id. at 96.
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with unions on union terms. The unions could push up
wages and successfully demand uneconomic, or "feather-
bedding," make-work without fear of low-cost, nonunion
competitor companies taking the established carriers'
business at the expense of jobs of union members. As a
result, trunk airline wages on the major airlines rose much
more rapidly between 1967 and 1981 (when the impact of
deregulation began to be felt) than did wages in the non-
farm manufacturing sector. Indeed, "[i]f airline wages
had just remained competitive with the manufacturing
sector of the economy, pay per unit of output for the
trunk airlines would be 30 percent lower today."'
These high wages extend to all airline employee classes.
For example, in 1980 airline employees in such jobs as
keypunch operators earned thirty-one to eighty-two per-
cent more than their counterparts in other industries. Po-
sitions such as pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants,
which are less comparable to jobs elsewhere, are also paid
considerably in excess of any reasonably comparable
work, leading to the conclusion that airline employee un-
ions have been very successful in capturing a considerable
share of the industry's increased productivity.5 2
Table 8 adds further emphasis to the cost significance
of wages and salaries in the airline industry. This table
also demonstrates that, contrary to much discussion, em-
ployment has increased 15.3 percent during deregulation,
from 313,522 in 1978 to 361,375 in 1986. Although em-
ployment did decline between 1980 and the first quarter
of 1984, it did not decline below the 1978 figure. This
drop was most likely more attributable to the severe re-
cession and to the strike of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers' Organization (PATCO), which restricted car-
rier expansion, than to deregulation.5" A careful study of
so Id at 101.
52 Id at 102.
-13 For an analysis of the labor situation during this period, see New Employee-
Relations Climate, supra note 42, at 167-81; see also Northrup, The Rise and Demise of
PATCO, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 167 (1984).
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airline deregulation by Morrison and Winston concluded
"that deregulation has not had an adverse effect on indus-
try employment. ' 54 Meanwhile, during deregulation, av-
erage annual airline compensation per employee has risen
from $28,127 in 1978 to $42,218 in 1986, an increase of
50.1 percent, while the employee cost index rose from
179.6 to 269.6, also a 50.1 percent upward change. (The
fact that average annual wages per employee declined
slightly in 1986 is undoubtedly a function of heavy hiring
of new employees who begin at entry wages, retiring of
highly paid senior employees, and substituting of two-en-
gine aircraft which have two pilots for three-engine air-
craft which carry three pilots and have higher flight crew
wages.)
- S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTs OF AIRLINE DEREGULA-
TION 46 (1986).






Average Compensation Total Cash
Total Cost Number of Per Employee Cost Index Operating
(S Millions) Employees (Annualized) (1972=100) Expenses
1970 8,865.69 297,875 12,978 82.9 46.0
1971 4,104.37 288,418 14,231 90.9 46.1
1972 4,580.77 292,562 15,657 100.0 46.9
1973 5,172.87 309,112 16,735 106.9 45.8
1974 5,621.11 302,683 18,571 118.6 41.6
1975 6,014.79 295,905 20,327 129.8 40.9
1976 6,710.08 300,581 22,324 142.6 41.4
1977 7,685.35 303,266 25,342 161.9 41.5
1978 8,818.54 313,522 28,127 179.6 41.7
1979 10,355.18 344,490 30,059 192.0 38.9
1980 11,600.33 350,654 33,082 211.3 35.2
1981 12,413.41 341,848 36,313 231.9 34.7
1982 12,578.72 321,748 39,095 249.7 35.0
I QTR 83 3,268.14 314,823 41,524 265.2 37.0
2 QTR 83 3,313.35 319,456 41,487 265.0 36.0
3 QTR 83 3,397.58 322,402 42,153 269.2 35.1
4 QTR 83 3 3 42.998 274
1983 133486 31756 203
1 QTR 84 3,383.47 316,634 42,743 273.0 36.1
2 QTR 84 3,420.89 322,632 42,412 270.9 34.7
3 QTR 84 3,472.79 329,420 42,169 269.3 34.3
4 QTR 84 3,7.76i 9260413 2A
1984 1,4 323683 42,164 =La 3-4.
1 QTR 85 3,546.06 325,362 43,595 278.4 35.9
2 QTR 85 3,654.11 332,315 43,984 280.9 35.3
3 QTR 85 3,660.73 345,646 42,364 270.6 33.8
4 QTR 85 317 45553 43.000 274.A m
1985 14575.61 337219 41223 2 3_4_
1 QTR 86 3,789.41 351,014 43,182 275.8 35.3
2 QTR 86 3,776.88 358,617 42,127 269.1 35.6
3 QTR 86 3,886.55 369,834 42,036 268.5 36.4
4 QTR 86 3,803.75 366.037 41.567 MIA
1986 5255 3135 42.218 26
SOURCE: Compiled by Air Transport Association.
Majors include American, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Flying Tiger, Northwest, Pan
American, Piedmont (being acquired by US Air), Transworld (TWA), United, and US Air.
Nationals include Alaska, Aloha, Hawaiian, Midway, and Southwest.
We are thus dealing with employment in an industry
that continues both to expand and to pay steadily rising,
very high wages at the top rank of American industry.
The airline industry has mitigated some of these costs by
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decreasing compensation as a percent of total cash
operating expenses from 41.7 percent in 1978 to 36.2
percent in 1986. Elimination of restrictive work rules and
more effective labor utilization have added to efficiency.55
Nevertheless, employee compensation in the industry is
among the highest in the world, and 36.2 percent of cash
operating expenses remains a very substantial cost
burden. The estimated costs of what a LPP would entail
in each of the three scenarios, as set forth below, clearly
demonstrate this fact, and reflect the already high
compensation in the industry.
C. Costs of LPPs-Three Scenarios
Given the assumed data for impact of a merger that
would eliminate each of three hubs, as set forth in Tables
1-6, and the real data concerning wages found in Tables 7
and 8 and Figure 1, we are now ready to estimate costs at
each of the three hubs. The costs are figured on the basis
of the key requirements of the standard LPP as described
in the summary above. Assumptions utilized in figuring
costs are set forth with the relevant data tables, and Ap-
pendix B contains more detailed explanations.
1. Dismissal and Displacement Costs
This is the largest cost item. The LPPs guarantee wages
for a period of four years to persons displaced to lower
rated jobs. Fringe benefits are also guaranteed concur-
rent with the dismissal/displacement benefit period. Dis-
missal allowances equal sixty percent of wages and
salaries and continue for a period of up to five years de-
pending on the dismissed employee's seniority. Tables 9-
11 show how this adds up. For the large hub, the cost
equals $286,350,399. For the medium hub, the cost
equals $120,883,804, and for the small hub, the cost
equals $64,731,423. Table 12 sets forth the special
, Id. at 43-46; see Mew Employee-Relations Climate, supra note 42.
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Number of Actual Moves
Employee Eligible Dismissal Employee Resulting in Displace- Total LPP
Group Employees Costs Moves Displacement ment Costs Costs
Management 0 $ 0 301 0 $ 0$ 0
Pilots 1,124 29,851,114 1,822 2,058 112,164,825 142,015,939
F/As 1,549 10,954,839 1,549 0 0 10,954,839
Agents 1,441 12.142,521 1,282 112 5,525,596 17,668,117
Res. & CTOs 1,547 10,823,814 774 67 3,173,124 13,996,938
Non-Mgmt. 551 2,673.003 0 0 0 2,673,033
Clerical 132 582,252 0 0 0 582,252
Skycaps 107 629,647 0 0 0 629,647
Mech. and 1,923 19,748,674 1,354 812 27,612,442 47,361,116
Base Maint.
Cleaners 342 2,642,398 209 42 82,004 2,724,402
Stock Clerk 85 1,264,334 90 9 43,931 1,308.265
Facilities Ser. 42 302,187 36 0 0 302,187
Ramp Service 1,933 43,042,364 537 215 3,091,300 46,133,664
Total 10,776 $134,657,177 7,954 3,315 $151,693,222 $286,350,399
F/As = Flight Attendants.
CTOs = City Ticket Offices.






Number of Actual Moves
Employee Eligible Dismissal Employee Resulting in Displace- Total LPP
Group Employees Costs Moves Displacement ment Costs Costs
Management 0 $ 0 176 0 $ 0$ 0
Pilots 740 5,913,477 1,142 2,141 72,938,717 78,852,194
F/As 1,327 8,274,189 1,027 0 0 8,274,189
Agents 568 2,976,457 555 48 2,368,113 5,344,570
Res. & CTOs 1,005 6,194,133 503 44 2,083,843 8,277,976
Non-Mgmt. 358 1,663,547 0 0 0 1,663,547
Clerical 69 304,359 0 0 0 304,359
Skycaps 93 495,373 0 0 0 495,373
Mech. and 775 6,828,525 216 54 1,836,295 8,664,820
Base Maint.
Cleaners 259 1,919,302 208 42 82,004 2,001,306
Stock Clerk 9 68,706 345 104 507,641 576,347
Facilities Ser. 30 204,930 78 0 0 204,930
Ramp Service 659 5,649,067 198 40 575,126 6,224,193
Total 5,892 $40,492,065 4,748 2,473 $80,391,739 $120,883,804
F/As - Flight Attendants.
CTOs = City Ticket Offices.







Number of Actual Moves
Employee Eligible Dismissal Employee Resulting in Displace- Total LPP
Group Employees Costs Moves Displacement ment Costs Costs
Management 0 $ 0 75 0 $ 0$ 0
Pilots 406 2,581,827 812 1,576 40,050,287 42,632,114
F/As 498 1,950,168 299 0 0 1,950,168
Agents 460 2,231,460 392 34 1,677,413 3,908,873
Res. & CTOs 517 2,816,055 244 23 994,561 3,810,616
Non-Mgmt. 183 807,213 0 0 0 807,213
Clerical 27 119,097 0 0 0 119,097
Skycaps 14 49,973 0 0 0 49,973
Mech. and 483 4,255,713 282 71 2,414,388 6,670,101
Base Maint.
Cleaners 45 315,810 0 0 0 315,810
Stock Clerk 5 38,170 0 0 0 38,170
Facilities Ser. 2 13,662 0 0 0 13,662
Ramp Service 527 4,271,845 111 10 143,781 4,415,626
Total 3,167 $19,450,993 2,215 1,714 $45,280,430 $64,731,423
F/As = Flight Attendants.
CTOs = City Ticket Offices.
TABLE 12
ASSUMPTIONS FOR TABLES 9-11
Displacement
* All fringe benefits are included in displacement costs, except for medical
insurance. It is assumed that medical insurance is not a payroll related
fringe benefit and will remain constant, no matter what the payroll cost
variations.
* Facilities services (cleaners/janitors) remaining after the termination are
absorbed by the system and no displacement occurs.
* Station agents do not "bump" or displace a reservation agent. Both
groups of agents are assumed to move from full- to part-time agents
based on a system-wide percentage of part-time agents to all agents of
8.7%.
" Actual pilot moves are assumed to result in a series of bumps, reflecting
the seniority hierarchy and the number of changes necessary to get each
remaining pilot into the proper slot.
* Flight attendant displacement allowance is insignificant and not included.
The real difference includes the pay differentials between a few regular
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flight attendants and those that receive first flight attendant pay
premiums.
The ground crew employee moves are assumed to cause varying amounts
of displacements in the system in relation to the number of moves and
how well the system can absorb them. In 100 moves, it is assumed the
system can absorb 90%, with only 10 displacements; in 1000 moves only
50% will be absorbed resulting in 500 displacements.
Dismissal
Current employment levels are assumed to remain static; i.e., no changes
in numbers or seniority of employees. The closing of a hub occurs on
January 1st, with all employees having at least 1 year of seniority at the
time and eligibility for a minimum of 6 months dismissal allowance.
* The dismissal allowance includes all fringe benefits, with the exception of
medical insurance, in proportion to the 40% reduction in salary that is the
basis for the dismissal allowance calculation. Medical insurance is in-
cluded at a fixed cost rate per employee.
* All termination benefits extend concurrently so that severance/furlough is
paid first and the dismissal allowance is paid next. Both benefit times to-
gether do not exceed the duration allowed as the dismissal allowance
maximum in the Labor Protective Provisions - 5 years.
These extraordinarily high costs may seem unrealistic to
someone not familiar with the airline industry. If one considers
how downsizing is practiced in the industry, however, it be-
comes clear that these scenarios are based upon practical mod-
els. For example, the airline miaht alter its equipment mix.
Pilots are compensated on the basis of the size and speed of the
aircraft, among other variables. Therefore, if DC-10 pilots are
moved to DC-9s, their higher DC-10 pay rate is maintained by
the LPP requirements. Moreover, DC-10s carry a three-man
flight crew, and DC-9s carry a two-man crew. The three DC-10
crew members then bump down, and those they bump exercise
their seniority over others, until the most junior personnel are
dismissed. All those downgraded in the process receive dis-
placement allowances, and those dismissed receive dismissal
pay.
The same process governs all other employee classes. Senior
personnel bump into lower positions, and the downward exer-
cise of seniority continues, causing the displacement of the
most junior personnel. Huge displacement allowances and dis-
missal payments result. Moreover, because the airlines employ
a substantial number of women, many two-breadwinner family
personnel are involved. Employees receive sixty percent dis-
missal pay with taxes reduced from full pay and have no obliga-
tion to work for up to five years. Dismissal pay permits a more
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relaxed home life, eliminates the need for paid child care, and
allows spouses to work intermittently on the side on a cash ba-
sis. These factors weaken the incentive to obtain another job
and thereby to reduce the carrier's liability.
Interestingly, our data show that the mechanics and base
maintenance operations have the highest displacement and dis-
missal costs. There are many grades of this class, and the num-
bers required are directly related to the equipment utilized.
Downsizing results in a plethora of bumps, triggering displace-
ment allowances and dismissal payments in large amounts.
Mechanics have skills appropriate for many industries and most
could likely find nonairline industry jobs, although perhaps not
at the high compensation rates paid by the airlines.
Although the LPP costs for displacement and dismissal al-
lowances as shown in Tables 9-11 are high, they are probably
underestimated. For one thing, they do not include the train-
ing costs and reduced productivity which inevitably result from
a series of such seniority exercising. Except for pilot training
costs, which are estimated and discussed below, no estimates
could reasonably be made for these very real costs. Yet, any-
one cognizant of the industrial process knows that employees
in unfamiliarjobs require training and are less productive for a
period while they grow familiar with and competent in new po-
sitions. Moreover, in a service business like the airlines,
unfamiliarity with job details by employees in a new position
can materially affect customer satisfaction and future business.
Another reason why the estimated costs in Tables 9-11 may
understate actual costs is that the assumptions listed in Table
12 are necessarily restrictive in order to permit easier calcula-
tions. Bumping is restricted to one level moves, and pilot
length of service is very conservatively estimated. A real situa-
tion would probably not replicate these very limiting and cost-
reducing assumptions.
2. Pilot Re-Training
Table 13 shows estimated pilot training and retraining
costs. Pilots need retraining whenever they are trans-
ferred to new equipment. The extent and cost of such
training depend upon several factors including the pilot's
previous experience, the nature of equipment, and Fed-
eral Aviation Authority (FAA) rules. As a result, the size
of the hub is not the only guiding variable. The extent of
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equipment, route changes, etc., may be even more signifi-
cant. Nevertheless, a larger hub does mean that more
people are displaced, thus involving more training and
greater costs. If data for the cost of training and retrain-
ing nonpilot employees could be developed, the hub size
would undoubtedly become a more dominant factor, be-
cause equipment size and routes would then not necessar-
ily be the significant factors. Pilot retraining and training
costs of over twenty million dollars for the large hub,
about thirteen million dollars for the medium one, and
nearly eight million dollars for the small one emphasize




Total Pilot Total Pilot Total Retraining
Reduction Retraining Costs
Small Hub 406 1,689 $ 7,628,463
Medium Hub 740 3,075 12,928,235
Large Hub 1,124 4,807 20,321,504
Assumptions:
* There is a 40:60 ratio of those pilots who need initial training to those who need
retraining. This ratio, which is believed to be realistic, is utilized.
" Training costs include pilot pay plus a cost of living allowance of $1.40/hr. for 24
hrs/day, plus $30/day for a hotel.
" DC-10 initial training per crew includes the cost of one day of actual flight time of
$5,600 for fuel, maintenance and landing rights.
" With the amount of retraining required it is necessary either to shut the airline
down or reduce the size of the workforce by multiple bids. This necessitates
multiple retraining and causes the number of retrainings to exceed the size of the
workforce.
3. Severance Costs
Table 14 estimates the severance costs for the three
hubs, and Table 15 lists the assumptions underlying the
estimates. Again these assumptions are conservative, es-
pecially in regard to management seniority and vacation
pay, but the amounts are substantial with $32.8 million
for the large hub, $13.3 million for the medium hub, and
$6.3 million for the small hub.






No. of Severance As a Result And Vacation
Hub Class ofEmloee Employees Expense Of Severance Expense
Small Facilities Service 2 $ 1,592 $ 1,592 $ 3,184
Hub Ramp Service 527 521,977 521,977 1,043,954
Stock Clerk 5 4,592 4,592 9,184
Mech. & Base Maint. 483 530,527 530,527 1,061,054
Airline Service 45 37,116 37,116 74,232
Agents 976 591,353 591,353 1,182,706
Clerical 27 13,068 13,068 26,136
Non-Management 183 88,572 88,572 177,144
Skycaps 14 4,984 4,984 9,968
Pilots 406 426,099 410,633 836,732
Flight Attendants 498 262,298 262,298 524,596
Management 466 672,040 672,040 1.344,080
Total Emp. Reduction 3,632 $ 3,154,218 $ 3,138,752 $ 6,292,970
Medium Facilities Service 30 $ 23,880 $ 23,880 $ 47,760
Hub Ramp Service 659 699,807 699,807 1,399,614
Stock Clerk 9 8,262 8,262 16,524
Mech. & Base Maint. 775 850,950 850,950 1,701,900
Airline Service 259 229,167 229,167 458,334
Agents 1,572 1,080,025 1,080,025 2,160,050
Clerical 69 33,396 33,396 66,792
Non-Management 358 186,126 186,126 372,252
Skycaps 93 44,310 44,310 88.620
Pilots 740 1,732,180 1,063,498 2,795,678
Flight Attendants 1,327 921,078 921,073 1.842,146
Management 815 1,175,348 1,175,348 2,350,696
Total Emp. Reduction 6,780 $ 6,984,524 $ 6,315,842 $13,300,366
Large Facilities Service 42 $ 35,767 $ 35,767 $ 71,534
Hub Ramp Service 1,933 3,520,459 2,691,267 6,211.726
Stock Clerk 85 100,989 100,989 201,978
Mech. & Base Maint. 1,923 2,542,825 2,542,825 5,085,650
Airline Service 342 319,073 319,073 638,146
Agents 2,980 2,262,014 2,262,014 4,524,028
Clerical 132 63,888 63,888 127,776
Non-Management 551 303,625 303,625 607,250
Skycaps 107 51,478 51,478 102,956
Pilots 1,124 6,881,438 1,994,062 8,875,500
Flight Attendants 1,549 1,113,730 1,113,730 2,227.460
Management 1,431 2,099,413 2,064,075 4,163,488
Total Emp. Reduction 12,199 $19,294,699 $13,542,793 $32,837,492
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TABLE 15
SEVERANCE ASSUMPTIONS
Seniority levels system wide affected by the closing of a hub and resulting in ter-
mination, determined the level of seniority terminated at the closed hub. All
others at the hub are dispersed into the system. Example:
Reduction in System Reductions in Hub
0-1 years seniority 100 20
1-2 years seniority 300 40
Total Reductions 400 60
Total at Hub 200
Total dispersed to system 200 - 60 140
Assumptions:
" Fringe expense includes group insurance, pension, FICA, and Worker's Compensation
for each class of worker. Fringe benefits end with the last severance payment or LPP
dismissal payment.
" Management seniority is proportional to non-management seniority since a specific
breakdown of management seniority was not available.
* All workers were assumed to be full-time, non-probationary employees with at least I
year of seniority.
* Severance policy has 2 weeks ofseverance for employees with up to 3 years of service with
a week for each additional year of service up to 16 weeks.
" The effective date of the employee reduction is assumed to be January 1st. Severance
policy pays out earned vacation from previous year, before severance pay is initiated.
Total severance cost is the sum of earned vacation and severance pay. Accrued vacation,
although normally part of the severance payout, is not included because it would be zero
on January I st.
" Pilot's severance policy requires 45 days' notice of reduction in force. It is assumed that
this notice is included in the time period that it takes to retrain pilots for new positions in
the reduced workforce.
4. Moving Costs and Real Estate Assistance
The airlines have a three year obligation to move em-
ployees and their families and provide real estate assist-
ance when leases are broken and homes cannot be sold
for "fair value." Tables 16-18 contain estimated moving
costs, again not trivial, for each of the three hubs. Table
19 describes the assumptions used in figuring these costs.
Table 20 estimates real estate assistance costs. Table 20
assumes that houses would sell below cost in fifteen per-
cent of the cases. If a hub located in a depressed real es-
tate area such as Denver or Houston in 1985-87, however,
then the carrier would incur moving costs much greater
than those set forth in Table 20, because houses would
sell below cost in far more than fifteen percent of the
cases.



















































































* 25% of eligible moves will actually move, including 27 who receive real estate
assistance.
I 1 initial move will result in 2 actual moves due to "bumping" of lower seniority
employees.
. For every two eligible moves there will be one actual move.
.. Although there are employees eligible for a move, it is assumed that employees at this
level will not move.
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* 25% of eligible moves will actually move, including 2% who receive real estate
assistance.
I 1 initial move will result in 2 actual moves due to "bumping" of lower seniority
employees.
** For every two eligible moves there will be one actual move.
Although there are employees eligible for a move, it is assumed that employees at this












































































* 25% of eligible moves will actually move, including 27 who receive real estate
assistance.
1 initial move will result in 2 actual moves due to "bumping" of lower seniority
employees.
* For every two eligible moves there will be one actual move.
* Although there are employees eligible for a move, it is assumed that employees at this
level will not move.
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TABLE 19
MOVING ASSUMPTIONS
* One airline analysis showed average moving costs to be $5,100. In addi-
tion management employees were eligible for real estate assistance. An
average management cost an additional $25,000.
" The number of eligible moves is generated by the greater of: 1. the
number of employees at the closed hub; or 2. the number of employees
reduced in the system by the closing of a hub. This does not include pi-
lots and flight attendants who are assumed to move less often because of
the ability to commute.
" Pilots eligible for a move were assumed to be equal to the size of the
system reduction, less those pilots terminated at the hub.
* Flight attendants eligible for a move were equal to the actual size of the
reduction in flight attendants for the medium and large hub scenarios. In
the small hub the eligible moves were assumed equal to half of the reduc-
tion in the system since there were no flight attendants stationed at the
hub.
* Agent and ramp servicer eligible moves are a ratio of the number of agent
and ramp servicer reductions in the system to the number of agent and
ramp servicer reductions at the hub, multiplied times the number of non-
terminated agents and ramp servicers at the hub.
Mechanics and Base Maintenance.
" Small and large hubs have only line maintenance.
* Medium hub has mainly base maintenance.
" Small and large hubs assume that line mechanic moves are equal to a ratio
of the total number reduced in the system to the total at the hub, times the
number of non-terminated mechanics at the hub. Base maintenance sys-
tem moves are assumed to be zero, since they will come out of the base
maintenance facility at low seniority levels.
• Medium hub assumes that all system mechanic reductions will result in a
move. Base maintenance reductions will come out of the lowest levels of
base maintenance seniority in this city since this is where all the junior
mechanics are located. Any movement between line and base is not an
expense since the hub and base are in the same location.




Projected Renters Total Costs Homeowners Total Total
Actual w/Lease to Break Who Do Not Cost LPP
Employee Breaking Employee Receive Fair For Fair R.E.
Moves Costs Leases Market Value Market Assist.
Small Hub 2,215 277 $221,500 249 $1,658,340 $1,879,940
Medium Hub 4,748 594 $475,200 534 $4,640,460 $5,115,660
Large Hub 7,954 994 $795,200 895 $6,130,750 $6,925,950
LPP Real Estate assistance insures fair market value (not including the effects of the
acquisition on the value of Real Estate) in the selling of an employee's home. In addition it
insures the costs associated with breaking a lease of those renters required to relocate.
ASSUMPTIONS:
* 25% of Projected Actual Employee moves are renters; 75% are homeowners.
* 50% of renters will have to incur costs associated with breaking their lease. $800 is the
assumed cost, which is equal to two months rent.
* 15% of homeowners will not receive fair market value for their home. They will receive
only 90%7 of the fair market value.
* Average home value based on 1980 U.S. Census Statistics updated to 1984 by the U.S.




D. Total Estimated Costs
The total estimated costs for each hub are set forth in
Table 21. They are indeed awesome, totaling
$387,600,745 for the large hub, $176,717,865 for the me-
dium hub, and $91,999,296 for the small hub. Although
these data do not include either the very real costs for
training and retraining employees or the productivity
losses resulting from the exercise of seniority by all
nonpilot employees, we believe that these cost scenarios
both conservatively and realistically reflect what might oc-
cur under the conditions specified.
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TABLE 21
TOTAL LPP COSTS-THREE HUB SIZES
Large Hub Medium Hub Small Hub
Total Costs 387,600,745 176,717,865 91,999,296
Dismissal and Displacement 286,350,399 120,833,804 64,731,423
Pilot Re-Training 20,321,504 12,928,235 7,628,463
Severance 32,837,492 13,300,366 6,292,970
Moving Costs 41,165,400 24,539,800 11,466,500
Real Estate Assistance 6,925,950 5,115,660 1,879,940
Source: Tables 1-20.
E. Costs and Benefits of Different Employee Classes
The data presented thus far estimate the total costs
mandated by LPPs for employee displacements, dismis-
sals, and related shifts. Tables 22 and 23 estimate how
much these benefits cost the carriers while benefitting in-
dividuals in key classes. In Table 22 the illustrations of
costs include the transfer of a captain from a DC-10 to a
Boeing 757. Since the former aircraft is larger and heav-
ier, both factors which figure in the pay rate, the carrier
would pay $45,653 for having the captain perform the
same work on a different aircraft. If the carrier trans-
ferred a first officer from a DC-10 to the same position on
a Boeing 727, the carrier would pay nearly $63,000, again
for having him do the same job on a smaller, lighter
plane. An agent going from full to part-time work would
cost the carrier the most-$73,216 even though the salary
would be considerably below that of a pilot.
These costs could be the highest where a carrier's
equipment is the newest. The Boeing 707, 727 and the
older classes of the Boeing 747, the DC-8, the DC-10, and
the Lockheed L- 1011 all require a three-man crew and are
scheduled to be phased out of service. Newer aircraft all
require only two pilots. Thus, if a modernly equipped air-
line merges with a carrier that has not kept its equipment
current, second officers are certain to be displaced or dis-
missed and others changed to different aircraft as the sur-
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viving carrier concentrates its fleet on newer types of
aircraft. The LPP costs involved can then be huge.
Table 23 shows the costs and benefits which might ac-
crue to employees dismissed as a result of a merger if a
LPP were in effect. The costs are severe and the benefits
are liberal indeed, varying from $507,935 for a DC-10
captain to $118,527 for an agent. There is no precedent
in American industry for dismissal pay of such magnitude
for nonexecutive employees. LPPs clearly involve very
high benefits to a small number of already highly paid
employees.
Some mergers do not involve the dissolution of the ac-
quired carrier's hub. For example, American's acquisition
of Air California5 6 did not result in the dissolution of Air
California's hub, because American did not have a strong
representation in the California market. Even that
merger, however, involved substantial employee moves
and eliminated the Air California headquarters office.
The merger is also likely to result in the disposal of vari-
ous Air California aircraft that are incompatible with
American's fleet. In turn, this will involve the transfer-
ring, training, and downgrading of flight crew and
mechanics. If conducted under LPPs, all of these moves
would have remained excessively costly for several years.
so American Airlines, Inc. and ACI Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-3-80
(Mar. 30, 1987).
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TABLE 22
COSTS AND BENEFITS TO SELECTED
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE FOR
DISPLACEMENT
Original Annual Total Cost
Wage Without Displace- Moving for Displace-
Employee Group Seniority Fringe ment Cost Cost ment Period






















" Employee is at peak pay and seniority.
" Displacement includes fringe benefits.
" A moving cost is assumed to occur for the employee displaced for our example,
although a move is not always an occurrence in a displacement.
" F/O = First Officer; S/O = Second Officer.
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TABLE 23
COSTS AND BENEFITS TO SELECTED EMPLOYEES
ELIGIBLE FOR DISMISSAL
Annual Total
Annual Rate of Costs Total for
Rate of Pay Severance Severance Dismissal First Dismissal
Pay w/Fringe Period Costs Costs Year Period
Captain DC-10 123,678 161,004 5 months 67,085 56,108 123,193 507,935
F/O DC-10 85,636 111,481 5 months 46,450 39,418 85,868 356,164
S/0 DC-10 75,948 98,869 5 months 41,195 35,168 76,363 317,514
F/A 34,018 41,362 16 weeks 12,727 17,146 29,873 128,941
Agent 29,660 36,666 16 weeks 11,282 15,823 27,105 118,527
Mechanic 36,327 44,522 16 weeks 13,699 19,362 33,061 144,930
Ramp 81,140 38,165 16 weeks 11,743 16,951 28,694 126,622
Assumptions:
* Severance and dismissal extend concurrently so that severance is paid first and dismissal
is paid next.
* Employee is at peak pay and seniority.
• Employee is eligible for maximum dismissal.
* Severance includes total fringe benefits.
* Dismissal costs include fringe benefits that are payroll related at 60%; non-payroll related
benefits (i.e., medical, dental, etc.) are at a fixed cost.
* Accrued vacation payoff is not included for these employees. Prior to the start of
severance there would normally be a period of vacation paid or taken.
* F/O = First Officer, S/O = Second Officer; F/A = Flight Attendant.
IV. SOME ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
It would be fatuous to assume that LPP costs of this na-
ture do not alter decision making by workers and manage-
ment. Indeed, ample evidence exists that LPPs have a
profound impact. Earlier, it was noted that the prohibi-
tion of layoffs in the railroad industry effectively barred
mergers during the early 1930s.57 A commentator found
that the turndown of the Santa Fe-Southern Pacific
merger by the Interstate Commerce Commission was
likely to cause railroads to emphasize reducing labor costs
instead of seeking economies in mergers.
Industry executives say they would be forced to address
their basic operating and labor problems that they were
reluctant to tackle as long as cost efficiencies from merg-
ing were available. 'There will be a lot of labor unrest,'
-7 REHMUS, supra note 24.
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says Anthony Sarkis, president of the National Industrial
Transportation League, a shipper group. 8
Finding that mergers did not solve the railroads' basic
high labor cost problem, this commentator then declared
that the opposite may be true:
In fact, mergers may have added to the railroads' labor
costs. One reason is that labor unions have negotiated job
protection agreements in exchange for their support of
the mergers .... 'I worked maybe a month last year, but I
still collected my paycheck every week,' says David
Halterman, a former clerk for the Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad. Mr. Halterman left a protected job for one that
he said offered opportunity for advancement. Plus, he
says that at 33, he is 'a little young to be retired.'59
Several airlines have made it clear that the imposition of
LPPs would have altered their plans, or indeed did so, to
the detriment of both airline employment and the Ameri-
can economy. In two recent cases, for example, carriers
took over airlines in, or close to, bankruptcy, thus saving
numerous jobs. The first case, the Midway-Air Florida
Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding,6 ° involved Midway's
purchase of certain operations and facilities of Air Florida,
which was in bankruptcy. Midway asserted that if the
DOT imposed a LPP on the transaction, it would not pro-
ceed with its plan, which included employing many of Air
Florida's employees who were forced out of their jobs by
the bankruptcy.6' No other airline appeared interested in
Air Florida. The DOT correctly concluded that the impo-
sition of a LPP would be detrimental to Air Florida
employees.62
58 Machalaba, Railroads May Be Forced to Cut Costs After ICC Reection of Proposed
Merger, Wall St. J., July 28, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
50 Id. at col. 4.
- D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-33 (June 11, 1985).
- Id. at 3. "Midway had stated it would not proceed with the acquisition if
LPP's were imposed, that the imposition of LPP's would presumably cause Mid-
way to abandon the transaction, and that the net result would be the denial ofjobs
to the Air Florida employees." Id.
w2 To Ensure Fair Treatment of Airline Employees in Airline Mergers and Similar Transac-
tions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
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Southwest's takeover of Muse in Southwest Airlines-Muse
Air Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding63 was a similar case.
Muse was not in bankruptcy, but it was rapidly running
out of cash and would probably have had to cease opera-
tions rather quickly if not rescued by a takeover. Since
Muse operated almost parallel to Southwest, the latter
could have purchased equipment and probably won most
of the Muse traffic if Muse went out of business. Hence
Southwest emphatically stated that it would not take over
Muse and save the jobs of the employees if the DOT were
to impose a LPP. Again, the DOT concluded that the LPP
would be a detriment, not a benefit, to employees.64
The threat of a LPP can also limit, or even destroy, the
ability of a carrier that has gone bankrupt to revive itself
and rehire some employees. Furthermore, it can restrict
the ability of carers to purchase equipment. For exam-
ple, Braniff's ability to revive from bankruptcy as a small
carrier was undoubtedly conditioned upon its selling
many of its aircraft. The carrier that purchased several
such aircraft clearly would not have done so if the transac-
tion had been covered by a LPP..5
Further evidence indicates that the mandatory imposi-
tion of LPPs as required by H.R. 1101, or threats thereof,
can materially affect equipment purchased and the bal-
ance of payments as well as employment. For example,
one carrier purchased used aircraft abroad rather than in
the United States while Congress was considering enact-
ing LPP legislation in 1982 in order to avoid coverage if
such legislation were enacted. 66 Such overseas transac-
tions not only cost Americans jobs, but also further inflate
the deficit in the United States' balance of payments.
Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1986) (testimony of Matthew V.
Scocozza, Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation) [hereinafter Hearings].
' D.O.T. Order No. 85-6-79 (June 2, 1985).
- Hearings, supra note 62, at 29. Muse, renamed, later ceased operations.
"., Hearings, supra note 62, at 114 (testimony of Robert E. Cohn, then general
counsel, People Express Airlines).
Id. at 110.
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The United Airlines-People Express-Texas Air deals in-
volving Frontier afford a good example of how costs can
determine whether mergers can be effectuated and jobs
can be preserved. As part of its arrangement to buy Fron-
tier, United agreed to purchase some of Frontier's Denver
airport gates, two hangars, and certain of its aircraft.6 7
The deal depended upon United reaching a satisfactory,
cost-efficient labor agreement (with, no doubt, no LPPs)
with its pilots. United found it impossible to achieve such
an agreement. Frontier had earlier become clearly a non-
viable airline close to\ bankruptcy, which led to its
purchase by People Express in late 1985 and to drastic
wage reduction agreements.6 8 Frontier's continued losses
of about ten million dollars per month devastated People
Express and resulted in People Express' proposed sale to
United six months later. Texas Air Corporation finally ac-
quired People Express, Frontier included, after Frontier
declared bankruptcy.6 9
The original deal for United's purchase of Frontier col-
lapsed because the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
chapter refused United's proposal to hire Frontier pilots
on its "B" scale. The "B" scale is the lower of the two-tier
pilot salary scale negotiated for new employees. After five
years, the former Frontier pilots would have achieved "A"
status. According to United, this would have meant an
' This deal was never fully consummated, although United did make a down-
payment to Frontier just prior to Frontier's bankruptcy. In 1985 the beleaguered
Frontier sold twenty-five of its seventy-seven planes to United. United did not
gain possession of the gates and hangars involved in the proposed 1986 deal
before Frontier filed for bankruptcy, however. After Texas Air purchased Fron-
tier, a court ruled that Frontier, as an indirect unit of Texas Air, could maintain
control of the hangars and gates until the issue could be fully adjudicated as part
of Frontier's bankruptcy case. This left the facilities to be utilized by Continental,
the Texas Air subsidiary which had already assumed Frontier's operations. To
avoid long litigation, Texas Air and United settled out of court. Texas Air kept
the assets and transferred fifty-five million dollars to Frontier. Frontier then reim-
bursed United forty million dollars. Texas Air to Buy Gates, Hangars for $55 Million,
Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
People Express, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 85-11-58 (Nov. 20, 1985).
Texas Air Corp. and People Express, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 86-10-53 (Oct.
24, 1986).
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approximate $50,000 increase over this period. Absent
an agreement with the pilots, United exercised its option
to void the merger. People Express then put Frontier in
bankruptcy, throwing all the latter's employees out of
work. After Texas Air purchased People Express, includ-
ing Frontier's assets, some former Frontier employees ac-
cepted positions with Continental, the subsidiary of Texas
Air. Many employees, however, took the severance pay
that Texas Air offered without the compulsion of a LPP.
United employed some of these employees, including pi-
lots. Under the seniority rules these former Frontier em-
ployees came in as new United employees at the bottom
of the "B" scale. Those employees who joined Continen-
tal were employed under pay scales lower than the Fron-
tier pay scales. Thus, the failure of the United pilots to
agree to United's terms was costly indeed to many Fron-
tier employees. °
The drastic job damage to Frontier employees in this
situation would have occurred even if the DOT had im-
70 Frontier's basic equipment was the Boeing 737. According to data provided
by the Airline Industrial Relations Conference (AIRCON), the seventy-five hour
annualized yield in 1986 for a Frontier captain on this plane was $4,960 per
month, or $59,520 per year. The captains flying the same equipment for United
had annualized yields of $8,597 per month, or $103,164 per year, resulting in an
annual difference between Frontier and United pilots of $43,644. Continental did
not operate the Boeing 737 before taking over the bankrupt Frontier. On the
comparable DC-9, also a two-engine plane with similar characteristics and usages
to the earlier model 737s, Continental captains had annualized yields of $4,288
per month, or $51,456 per year. This amount was $8,064 less per year than the
Frontier figure, and $51,708 less per year than that of United.
At the time of the proposed merger, a Boeing 737 captain at Frontier was re-
portedly paid $68,400 by Frontier and $115,000 by United, a difference of
$46,600. The United chapter of ALPA demanded that the gap be closed in eigh-
teen months. Frontier employees had no voice in the negotiations, which sealed
the airline's fate. Whatever the exact differential of pay between annual earnings
of captains at United and Frontier, it was approximately $40,000-50,000, and the
captains' earnings at Continental remained below those at Frontier. (Details were
extensively reported in the press during the summer of 1986. For a summary, see
United Holds Off on Bid to Buy Frontier, Says Impasse with Pilots Imperils Purchase, 150
DA LY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-3-4 (Aug. 5, 1986)).
The failure of United's attempt to purchase Frontier has hurt both it and its
pilots. Now that Continental controls Frontier's former gates and hangars, it has
replaced United as the No. 1 carrier in Denver, and United pilot job opportunities
have been lost.
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posed a LPP. United has assured this writer that it would
have declined to rescue Frontier's employees from bank-
ruptcy and unemployment if required to implement LPP
terms, even if United's pilots would have acceded to the
carrier's merger proposal. In addition to the displace-
ment and dismissal costs, United was especially concerned
about housing costs because of the severely depressed
and overbuilt Denver housing market where most of
Frontier's employees lived. Again, the employees would
have suffered from legislation that is avowedly being
pushed for their supposed benefit. Moreover, LPP legis-
lation is likely to be more damaging than intransigent
union policy, both because legislation is more far reach-
ing and because legislation, unlike union policies, cannot
be changed through negotiation. Texas Air made it very
clear that it would not have purchased the bankrupt Fron-
tier and the near bankrupt People Express if a LPP had
magnified the purchase price.
It should be emphasized that the carrier opposition to
LPPs is not grounded upon opposition to integrating sen-
iority lists, to paying severance to displaced employees, or
to reimbursing employees for specified moving expenses.
Carriers have done all these things in the major mergers
approved since the DOT has declined to order the imple-
mentation of LPPs. What the carriers want, and what
would appear to be inherent in a free employee relations
system, is to implement a fair system that is both efficient
and predictable from a cost standpoint through negotia-
tion with union employees and application to nonunion
employees. LPPs as instituted in the past or as contem-
plated by legislation involve excessive, unpredictable
costs. Moreover, by guaranteeing extraordinary pay-
ments in case of adversity to employees whose wages are
already substantially above the average of employees in
comparable jobs in other industries, the LPPs imposed by
the government act unfairly to the carriers and to the con-
sumers who must pay the ultimate costs.
The enactment of LPP legislation may preclude future
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mergers in the airline industry. This may well be the
short-term objective of the airline unions which support
such regulation. A reduction in airline mergers, however,
would clearly not result in employment stability or secur-
ity. Most observers, for example, believe Pan American
has little potential for long-term survival in its present
form.7 ' Pam American has already sold its most profitable
assets, i.e., the Intercontinental Hotel chain, the New
York City office building, and the Pacific routes, and ap-
parently it may also dispose of its New York to Boston and
to Washington, D.C. shuttle.72 Pan American basically
must depend upon its highly competitive North Atlantic
and South American routes and its weak domestic net-
work to survive. One hears frequent rumors that the com-
pany is for sale, but an aging workforce, older, less
efficient aircraft, and other liabilities reduce Pan Ameri-
can's merger potential. Additionally, if a LPP is required
for a merger, it would greatly hinder the deal. Then, Pan
American, which has already lost more than two billion
dollars since 1979, its last profitable year," might well be
forced to cease operations and to liquidate. Various do-
mestic and foreign carriers would assume its routes, and
its employees would lose their jobs instead of many gain-
ing positions with the acquiring carrier. Once again, a law
requiring a LPP would have a decidedly negative effect on
the employees that it was purportedly designed to
protect.
A. Other Adverse Impacts
The basic assumptions underlying the arguments of
LPP proponents is that LPPs will protectjobs and guaran-
71 See, e.g., Bennett, Pan Am's Disappearing Act, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, § 8, at
1, col. 2; Carley, A PanAm Takeover Would Boost Rivalry, Wall St.J.,Jan. 19, 1987, at
2, col. 2.
72 Schmitt, Pam Am Threatens Shuttle Service End, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1987, at 18,
col. 5 (Pan Am told its employees that it will sell the shuttle if it does not become
profitable).
7C Carey & Agins, Pan Am to Post Net Loss for '86 of $400 Million, Wall St.J., Feb.
13, 1987, at 8, col. 3.
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tee income without causing adverse reactions. The inci-
dents cited indicate the weakness of such propositions. In
fact, by adding to costs, LPPs are likely to force air fares
upward and thereby discourage traffic. As airline employ-
ees who have suffered during recessions well understand,
less traffic means fewer jobs.
LPP proponents also assume that employees who are
laid off or dismissed because of airline mergers or similar
activities will have few or no opportunities for employ-
ment in the industry. This is certainly inaccurate today
when airline employment is expanding. Pilots and other
flight crew members are very much in demand. Indeed,
for the first time in many years airlines are encouraging
applications from pilots who are trained elsewhere than in
the armed services because the need for pilots is so
great.7 4 Machinists and clerical employees find opportu-
nities not only among airlines, but among many other in-
dustries as well, and mechanics are now also in short
supply among several airlines.
B. Generous Unemployment Compensation
LPPs provide the most generous unemployment com-
pensation system in American history. Generally, state
unemployment compensation laws provide for payments
over a twenty-six week period. Occasionally, in times of
recession such payments have been extended up to sixty-
five weeks. The LPPs extend this duration of unemploy-
ment compensation to five years. In addition, provisions
guaranteeing wages and benefits regardless of the job
held or ofjob downgrading are not usually found in union
contracts because of their extreme costs, except where
such moves to lower rated jobs are short, temporary as-
signments. Yet LPPs would place this burden on carriers.
74 According to a study by the Congressional Research Service, the current de-
mand for civilian pilots is expected to remain at record levels for the next several
years, and a pilot shortage could occur. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PILOTS: THE LABOR MARKET RELATIONSHIP, REP. No. 86-28
E (1986).
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This is certainly very generous treatment on a compara-
tive basis. Moreover, it would apply to those employees
who are already among the highest paid in American in-
dustry. On the basis of equity, this does seem difficult to
justify.
Actually, the LPPs may hurt the favored airline employ-
ees in the long run. In the first place, the costs inhibit job
creation and thus are likely to diminish the prospects of a
return to work and/or to their former job by LPP recipi-
ents. In addition, LPPs can harm the long run job pros-
pects of downgraded or displaced employees. LPPs are
likely to inhibit such employees from seeking work with
greater long run opportunities that would utilize their tal-
ents more constructively. Some workers will take the initi-
ative to look elsewhere rather than accept payment for not
working. Many will not, and thus will fail to grasp oppor-
tunities. The result can be long-term unemployment
when the payments for not working cease.
C. Concluding Comment
Under regulation, unions in air transport grew very
strong and pushed wages close to the top of those in
American industry while management acquiesced and
permitted restraints on productivity and overmanning of
jobs as well. The carriers raised fares to cover those costs,
and air travel often cost more than the average consumer
could afford.
Deregulation forced a change. No longer protected
against competition, management was compelled to resist
uneconomic costs, and unions found that nonunion com-
petition restrained their power and ability to insist on ever
larger economic packages and productivity restraints. A
legislatively imposed LPP requirement could obviously
cause the airline industry to regress toward regulation.
Continued restructuring of the industry through competi-
tion will grow more difficult if each step costs from $92
million to $388 million. (See Table 21).
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Deregulation was clearly in the public interest. Morri-
son and Winston conclude that
on all efficiency grounds and on most distributional
grounds, airline deregulation has served the public inter-
est much more effectively than regulation would have.
Substantial progress has been made in achieving the so-
cially optimal level of fares and service for travelers....
The new industry capital structure will lead to more car-
rier efficiency gains under deregulation. It will also lead to
a reduction in industry costs, owing to more efficient use
of labor."
They also conclude that recent mergers and consolida-
tions "will not cause any harm to travelers' welfare. Ac-
tual and potential competition in high-density markets
should remain sufficient to maintain the level of benefits
achieved under deregulation. '76
Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan also support the thesis that
deregulation has been generally beneficial. They found
that regulation was not in the best interests either of carri-
ers or customers; that new schedules and better connect-
ing trips under deregulation are benefitting both carriers
and travelers; that costs have been reduced by improved
equipment and equipment usage, by improving cost con-
trols, and by eliminating "inflexible work rules and higher
than competitive pay;" and that customers have especially
benefitted by lower fares."
Because the benefits of deregulation are so clear, and
because the imposition of LPPs would so obviously be a
re-regulation measure, advocates of LPPs have altered
their rationale. Thus the 1986 House committee report in
support of H.R. 4838, which the House passed but the
Senate defeated, readily admitted that labor strife result-
ing from airline mergers was unlikely.7 8 Instead, propo-
7' S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 54, at 72.
16 Id. at 73.
7 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM, & D. KAPLAN, supra note 49, at 196-97.
78 H.R. REP. No. 822, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986). "In a deregulated system it
is unlikely that labor strife arising out of a merger would disrupt the national air
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nents of H.R. 4838 focused on the need for social welfare
legislation to assist workers displaced as a result of the
substantial merger activity in the airline industry. 79 Pro-
ponents have utilized these same arguments in support of
H.R. 1101 and S. 943, but they did not explain how to
justify such liberal social welfare provisions for employees
in an expanding industry who are among the highest paid
in the United States, or why the industry needs regulation
in this respect.
Competition has opened the airline industry to new en-
trepreneurs and has forced once-tired managements to
react, to rethink, and to redeploy their resources both
more economically and in a manner that better serves the
public interest. The imposition of LPPs could well reduce
employment, adversely affect the balance of payments,
discourage air traffic, and permanently damage an indus-
try now restructuring itself as a result of fair competition.
Neither the public nor the favored airline employees who
are already the most highly compensated employees in
American industry would benefit from the imposition of
LPPs.
transportation system since other carriers are free to provide the services affected
by the strike." Id.
79 See 132 CONG. REC. H6926-30 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1986). A merger places
"the careers and economic futures of airline employees ... at risk without guide-
lines from the Department of Transportation." Id at H6928 (statement of Rep.
Young).
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1ST SESSION H.R. 1101
To amend section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 to ensure fair treatment of airline employees in
mergers and similar transactions.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February, 1987
Mr. MINETA (for himself) and
Mr. Anderson, Mr. Hammerschmidt, Mr. Roe, Mr.
Strangeland, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Gingrich, Mr. Nowak, Mr.
Clinger, Mr. Rahall, Mr. Molinari, Mr. Applegate, Mr.
Sundquist, Mr. de Lugo, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Savage, Mr.
Packard, Mr. Bosco, Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Borski, Ms. Bent-
ley, Mr. Kolter, Mr. Towns, Mr. Wise, Mr. Gray (Ill.), Mr.
Visclosky, Mr. Traficant, Mr. Chapman, Ms. Slaughter,
Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Skaggs, and Mr. Perkins.
*A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section
408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958(49 U.S.C. App.
1378) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
"FAIR TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES
"(g) In any case which the Secretary determines that the
transaction which is the subject of the application would
tend to cause reduction in employment, or to adversely
affect the wages and working conditions including the
seniority of any air carrier employees, labor protective
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provisions calculated to mitigate such adverse conse-
quences, including procedures culminating in binding ar-
bitration, if necessary, shall be imposed by the Secretary
as a condition of approval, unless the Secretary finds that
the projected costs of protection would exceed the antici-
pated financial benefits of the transaction. The propo-
nents of the transaction shall bear the burden of proving
there will be no adverse employment consequences or
that projected costs of protection would be excessive."
(b) That portion of the table of contents contained in
the first section of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which
appears under the side heading "Sec. 408. Consolidation,
merger, and acquisition of control." is amended by ad-
ding at the end the following:
"(g) Fair treatment of employees.".
Although this Bill was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives on June 27, 1987, it was nevertheless added to
H.R. 3051, which in turn was passed by the House on Oc-
tober 5, 1987, and by the Senate on October 30, 1987.
The provision in S.943, which would transfer the au-
thority for imposing LPPs from the Department of Trans-
portation to the Department of Labor, was included in the
Senate version of H.R. 3051. Moreover, the Senate ver-
sion also included the wording of H.R. 3332, which ap-
plies to mergers involving short line railroads.
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The basic concept of our analysis was to identify the ef-
fects on a hypothetical airline with a reduction in force of
ten, twenty, or thirty percent. This reduction would occur
due to the closing of one of its hubs on January 1 st of next
year. The size of each hub was determined by the daily
ASMs generated at each hub and was compared to the to-
tal daily ASMs for the airline. For example, the small hub
had ten percent of the airline's total ASMs. The results of
our analysis of each of the three hub scenarios reflects the
individual composition of the hub closed and the specific
interaction that the hub had with the airline system as a
whole.
In order to determine the specific characteristics of
each hub and the hypothetical airline, actual data from an
operating airline was obtained and modified. This data
included the daily ASMs daily departures, monthly block
hours, monthly pilot and flight attendant hours and utili-
zation rates, employee headcount and distribution in the
system, and contract, wage and personel policies.
SEVERANCE
Severance costs were calculated first. Once we knew the
number of employees in each category in the system to be
reduced, we could determine the seniority levels in the
system affected and give a monetary value to each em-
ployee reduction. This monetary value included an aver-
age wage rate for the seniority level plus the appropriate
fringe or benefit expense. Since the hub is assumed to be
closed in the future, on January 1st with the current em-
ployee headcount and seniority levels static, the employ-
ees will have at least one year of seniority and be eligible
for the minimum two weeks of severance pay.
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Termination included the additional cost of paying
earned, but unused, vacation. Based on the personnel
policies, terminated employees' earned vacation payment
was calculated for the year prior to the January 1st dos-
ing. This payment included a normal work period rate of
pay, plus the associated fringe benefits based on those
payments.
In order to demonstrate the calculations, we can use a
category of IAM worker, the ramp servicers in the small
hub. There were 527 reductions from this group in the
total airline. Of those, 413 had one year of service, and
114 had two years of service. Workers with one or two
years of service were eligible for two weeks, or eighty
hours, of both severance pay and earned vacation. The
calculations were as follows:
413 employees ($11.15/hr x 80 hrs) = $368,396
114 employees ($16.84/hr x 80 hrs) = $153,581
$521,977
In this example, both severance and earned vacation
were the same eighty hour calculation, so that the total
severance and vacation expense was $1,043,954.
MOVING
The next major calculation was moving costs associated
with the closing of a hub. Moving costs arose because of
two factors. One factor involved moves of employees with
enough seniority at the hub not to be terminated. The
second factor involved moves in the system generated by
employee seniority, insuring the correct number of em-
ployees to provide the reduced level of service at each sys-
tem location. The methods used to calculate those
employees eligible for moves and projected actual moves,
varied for each employee group. The assumptions relat-
ing to each method used were included in either the page
of moving assumptions or the pages of hub moving costs.
The assumptions were based on knowledge of how these
employee groups functioned within the airline industry
and socio-economic factors affecting these employee
1987] 461
462 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
groups. There was consistency among groups whose
work was affected by similar factors.
The cost of an employee move ($5,100) included mov-
ing household goods, one house hunting trip, on the road
expenses to a new location and temporary living expenses
at the new location. In addition, management moves in-
cluded a real estate assistance cost of $25,000.
Continuing with our example of ramp servicers, of the
total 527 terminations, 120 were terminations at the small
hub for employees with one or two years of service. This
left 407 to be terminated through the rest of the system
and 87 (207 hub employees - 120 terminations) non-ter-
minations at the hub. To determine the eligible employee
moves for ramp servicers, we took a ratio of the ramp ser-
vicer reductions in the system to the ramp servicer reduc-
tions in the hub. This ratio was then used to adjust the
non-terminated ramp servicers at the hub. Through this
calculation we were able to more directly relate the effects
of the hub closing to the system. The groups of employ-
ees, ramp servicers, agents and mechanics, that were cal,
culated in this manner were most directly associated with
the hub and system interaction.
The calculation for eligible moves for ramp servicers
was as follows:
527 terminations in the system
X 87 nonterminations at hub = 221
207 terminations at the hub
Since we have assumed that for every two eligible ramp
servicer moves, only one would occur, there were only
111 actual moves.
111 @ $5,100/move = $566,100
LPP
LPP costs were the last to be determined. They were
considered in four parts: dismissal allowance, displace-
ment allowance, real estate assistance, and pilot re-
training.
The minimum dismissal allowance for a terminated em-
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ployee with one year seniority was six months. Since it
was assumed that termination benefits run concurrently,
the employee received severance for two weeks (for em-
ployees with one year of service), thereby leaving approxi-
mately 5.5 months of dismissal allowance.
The dismissal allowance was calculated at sixty percent
of the base pay rate, plus the associated fringe costs, with
the exception of medical related benefits. We assumed
that the carrier incurred a fixed cost per employee to pro-
vide these benefits, and the benefits were not determined
by payroll costs, as are other fringe benefits.
In our example for ramp servicers in the small hub:
413 employees X $1357/mo (wages at 60%
+ benefits) X 5.5 months = $3,082,426
114 employees X $1897/mo (wages at 60%
+ benefits) X 5.5 months = $1,189,419
Total Dismissal Allowance $4,271,845
The displacement allowance protects, for a period of
time, the original wages of an employee who now has
lower wages, resulting from either a change to a lower
paying position or to a position with fewer hours. The
displacement allowance was actually calculated on the dif-
ferential between the old wages and the new for a period
of four years.
The number of employee actual moves resulting from
displacement varies by employee group. All IAM moves
were assumed to cause a displacement, based on the ac-
tual number of moves and how well the system could ab-
sorb the moves. In other words, the greater the number
of moves, the greater effect on the system, the greater the
number of displacements.
In our example of 111 actual employee moves, a rather
small number out of the total servicers in the system, only
ten were assumed to be displaced down one level to air-
line servicers.
The example had a monthly wage and benefit differen-
tial of $299.54. Therefore,
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10 employees X $299.54/mo X 48 months = $143,781
total displacement cost.
Pilot displacement cost was calculated in the same man-
ner, yet the determination of the number of displace-
ments was different in that it was the result of shifts in the
seniority hierarchy and the resulting changes necessary to
get each remaining pilot into the proper slot.
We also calculated displacement for the agents. All
agent displacements were assumed to result from full-
time to part-time changes with the number of working
hours going from 40/week to 20/week. Once the differ-
ential was determined, the calculation was the same as for
the IAM workers.
Real estate assistance was comprised of two parts; one
relating to renters and the other to homeowners. The
rental assistance provided financial reimbursement for
those breaking a lease. For twenty-five percent of the em-
ployee moves, we assumed these costs to be the
equivalent of two months rent at $400/mo. We have also
assumed that only fifty percent of renters will need this
assistance, since many will walk away from their leases.
We assumed the remaining seventy-five percent of the
actual employee moves involved homeowners. Their real
estate assistance was designed to make up the difference if
they did not receive the fair market value for their dwell-
ing. We have assumed this occurs for fifteen percent of
the homeowners and was equal to only a ten percent loss
of fair market value.
In our continuing example, the 111 actual moves of
ramp servicers would involve twenty-eight renters and
eighty-three homeowners. Of the twenty-eight renters,
fifty percent or fourteen would be out of pocket $800 in
order to break their leases. This is a total of $11,200.
Of the eighty-three homeowners, twelve would not re-
ceive the fair market value for their home. In the small
hub, the average home was valued at $66,600. A ten per-
cent loss on that average home was $6,660, making the
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real estate assistance for the twelve moves equal to
$79,920.
Pilot retraining was considered as a part of the total
cost of LPP. In order to get the correct pilot, based on
seniority, into the right aircraft and the right seat, retrain-
ing was necessary. Retraining consisted of both pilots
who would need initial training because they had not
flown for over eighteen months, and pilots who would
only need requalification.
Initial training required anywhere from seventeen to
twenty-six working days, or twenty-one to thirty-three cal-
endar days, depending on the type of aircraft. The work-
ing days were spent in ground school and on a simulator.
In the case of DC 10's, one day was spent in the aircraft,
with an added cost of $5,600/plane for fuel, maintenance
and landing fees. It was assumed that three pilots would
be qualifiying at the same time. Requalification training
required eight working days and ten calendar days for
ground school and the simulator.
The costs calculated for retraining also included the pi-
lots' pay and fringe benefits for each working day. Based
on the union contract, pilots were paid at 4.5 hours per
day for requalification training and 2.67 hours per day for
initial training. The additional cost of per diem and a ho-
tel was calculated at $64/day for each calendar day of
training. For all DC 10 pilots, the cost of aircraft training
was also included.
465

Comments

